World War II Database

Contributor: C. Peter Chen

ww2dbaseThe successful annexation of Austria fueled Adolf Hitler's ambition, and he looked on to the German-populated regions of western Czechoslovakia, a region which the Germans called Sudetenland. As early as 1933, Nazi Party members such as Konrad Henlein had already infiltrated the political scene in Czechoslovakia, stirring trouble. On 19 May 1935, Henlein's Sudetendeutsche Partei won three out of every five German Czech's vote, creating the second largest political party in Czechoslovakia. Starting in 1938, the Nazi propaganda machine fabricated false stories of the three million ethnic Germans being oppressed in Czechoslovakia, and demanded to gain control of these lands. Meanwhile, British ambassador to Berlin Sir Nevile Henderson did little to help. In fact, he did the opposite, calling the highly educated Czech president Edvard Beneš "pigheaded" for leading his country to resist Nazi infiltration.

ww2dbaseCzechoslovakia partially mobilized its military on 20 May 1938 as a response. "It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future", Hitler said to his military advisors upon hearing the news of the Czechoslovakian mobilization. The threat, however, came at a great risk that Hitler was well aware of. Unlike Austria who lacked powerful allies, Czechoslovakia befriended Britain and France in the west and the Soviet Union in the east. The three powers had a keen interest in Czechoslovakia, for that she controls a series of strong fortifications that, if fallen, would open the gates wide toward the Balkans. The French fielded 100 divisions, and should Germany move against Czechoslovakia, there would had been only 12 divisions to defend the Franco-German border. Hitler knew that if a military conflict was to break out between Germany and Czechoslovakia, there would be a real danger of a war on two fronts, with a weak defensive line against the numerically superior French Army. Even the Czechoslovakian Army, which Hitler thought little of, had 30 divisions in reserve after full mobilization. Within the German Army itself, Hitler did not have unilateral support either. Erich von Manstein, for one, thought the move to be too daring. "[H]ad Czechoslovakia defended her self, we would have been held up by her fortifications," he said, "for we did not have the means to break through." In secret, some German Army leaders such as Franz Halder were organizing a revolt should Hitler come too close to plunging Germany into a war with Britain and France, a situation that was unwinnable according to the generals.

ww2dbaseWhat fueled Hitler in moving forth with the gamble was the appeasement sentiment from the top political leadership in the United Kingdom and France. As the political situation grew tense into Sep 1938, France, for example, went as far as demanding Czechoslovakia to cede the territory to Germany, otherwise France would not honor the mutual protection treaty that they had previously signed.

ww2dbaseOn 28 Sep 1938, Chamberlain convinced Hitler to host a multi-power conference to determine the Sudetenland issue. As Hitler barred Czechoslovakian representation to this meeting, Chamberlain cabled Beneš, promising that the United Kingdom had Czechoslovakia's best interest in mind; upon hearing this, Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk responded "If you have sacrificed my nation to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you. But if not, gentlemen, god save your souls."

ww2dbaseThe conference took place beginning on 29 Sep at the Führerhaus in Königsplatz in Munich, Germany. Prior to the meeting, Hitler and Italian leader Benito Mussolini met to devise a common strategy; Chamberlain and French leader Daladier did no such thing. Once the meeting began, the four leaders were generally cordial. Chamberlain attempted to change Hitler's mind in terms of Czechoslovakian representation in the talks, but could only convince Hitler to allow two Czechoslovakian representatives to be nearby in an adjacently room without actually partake in the conference. According to Wilhelm Keitel, Daladier was adamant in doing what it takes to avoid war, saying "[w]e won't tolerate war over this, the Czechs will just have to give way. We will simply have to force them to the cession." The four decided the fate for Czechoslovakia by granting Germany Sudetenland; the agreement was dated 29 Sep, but was not signed by Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier, in that order, until after midnight into 30 Sep. The two Czechoslovakian representatives were finally allowed to meet with Chamberlain and Daladier, but not Hitler and Mussolini, at this time; they noted that Chamberlain appeared to be exhausted while Daladier nervous, both avoiding prolonged conversations with them over this topic. Keitel was named as the military governor of Sudetenland per the agreement. The non-Germans who lived in Sudetenland were given ten days to leave; they were not allowed to take any of their possessions with them.

ww2dbaseSimilar to the situation in Austria months earlier, there were already many refugees in Sudetenland who had previously fled from Germany. Those who attempted to flee were denied visas by various countries, and many of them were deported back to Sudetenland, leaving them to certain persecution by the German occupation administration. Also like the Austrian annexation, the German propaganda machine publicized the crowds who welcomed the Germans while suppressing any anti-German sentiment.

ww2dbaseThe loss of Sudetenland damaged more than Czechoslovakian pride. From the military perspective, the loss of the Sudetenland region deprived the country of its natural defense (mountains) as well as its man-made fortifications (arguably the second best in Europe, after the French Maginot Line); this is especially disheartening since western Czechoslovakia was by this time surrounded on three sides by Germany. In fact, after Hitler had toured Sudetenland after the annexation, he was surprised to realize that if Germany had to resort to force to take Czechoslovakia, German troops would have been bogged down, thus would expose western Germany to a potential invasion for much longer. Economically, the loss of industrial facilities, mines, roads, and railways caused her to lose, directly or indirectly, 66% of its coal production, 80% of lignite, 86% of chemicals, 80% of cement, 80% of textiles, 70% of electric power, 40% of timber, and 70% of iron and steel.

ww2dbaseBelieving that Hitler would uphold his promise that Sudetenland represented his final territorial demand in Europe, Chamberlain noted that, now that this "most dangerous" obstacle to peace had been overcome, "I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity." In actuality, Hitler actually was frustrated by British and French concession of Sudetenland; he had secretly wished for resistance so that he would have the excuse to take the entire Czechoslovakia by force. Before Sudetenland was to be fully occupied by German troops, German leadership would already embark on revising the plans, both diplomatic and military, to acquire the rest of Czechoslovakia. On the diplomatic stage, nations in Eastern Europe began to doubt the sincerity Britain and France had toward their allies in the east; as a result, some of the Eastern European countries began to be friendlier toward Germany and the Soviet Union.

Munich Conference and the Annexation of Sudetenland Interactive Map

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