Winter War file photo

The Winter War

30 Nov 1939 - 13 Mar 1940

Contributor: Morgan Bell

"The ladies of St Petersburg could not sleep peacefully as long as the Finnish border ran so close"

Joseph Stalin could have uttered Peter the Great's words in late 1939, but for three minor facts: by then the city was called Leningrad; Stalin would not have recognised a lady had he tripped over her; and he was not keen on letting anyone sleep peacefully. Ignoring these minor points, something akin to these words would have not been far from Stalin's lips since the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Winter War would be fought for four months between one of the world's strongest military powers at the time and one of the least populated countries - not over land, resources, economics or ideology, but over security.

After weeks of secret negotiations, secret threats, open negotiations and open threats, the Soviets made the demands they had been hinting to all along. The border between Finland and the USSR on the Karelian Isthmus would be moved back a significant distance for the sake of Leningrad's security. The islands of Suursaari, Lavansaari, Tytarsaari and Koivisto be ceded to the Russians in exchange for twice as much Soviet land in East Karelia, for the sake of Baltic security. A 30 year lease of Hanko, with rights to establish a base there for military security. That was Stalin's final offer.

Retreating from the Karelian Isthmus would lose most of the fortifications of Finland's front line of defence, the Mannerheim Line. The population of Finland's attitude towards the Soviet threats barred the government ceding all the islands to the USSR, even if it was in exchange for double the amount of Soviet land elsewhere. And a lease for a military base at Hanko was a breach of Finland's decision to stay neutral with all the other Scandinavian states. How were the Finns to know if, after making and getting his demands, Stalin did not demand more? Besides, the recent dealings with Stalin showed that he was over-exaggerating his demands, and would later be haggled down. Or so the Finnish ministers thought. Stalin and Molotov could not have been more serious. A misreading of Finnish politics made them think they had a lot to fear, as did a misreading of the Finnish insistence of neutrality and ability to militarily resist any great European power. Previous experience and lack of serious military muscle showed that were Nazi Germany so inclined, it could launch an attack from Finnish territory, as well as gain access to a huge supply of nickel found at Petsamo only recently.

Only one loud voice of reason asked for a settlement with Stalin in the Finnish camp, and he was routinely ignored. Of course, when the Soviet tanks rumbled over the border, it would be his blood, sweat and tears that organised the stout Finnish resistance. Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim did not want to acquiesce to the Soviet demands, but saw the only way the army was prepared was in terms of morale. The Finns had 162 planes of all different vintages compared to 3,000 available modern planes on the Soviet attack. There was not a single anti-tank gun that hadn't arrived in the past few days, and anti-aircraft weaponry was just as scarce. The ammunition situation was dire. Not willing to take responsibility for an Army in such a dire predicament, Mannerheim handed in his resignation on the 27th of November, a day after the Soviets blamed the Finland for firing the first shot, looking for a pretext to invasion. As Soviet forces amassed on the border and Finnish politicians deceived themselves, a chill appeared in the air, heralding the second coldest winter in Finland since 1828. A problem the Red Army was totally unprepared for.

The Soviet order of battle on the 30th of November was the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus, with the 8th, 9th and 14th Armies spread out above Lake Ladoga with various objectives. This amounted to 250,000 Red Army soldiers with a variety of equipment and training, ranging from well equipped crack units, to scraped together green grunts that had been placed in a uni only days before. A significant amount of armoured units and artillery pieces were to be used in the blitzkrieg style tactics that had worked so well for the Germans in Poland and Zhukov in Khalkin Gol. The Soviets had an overwhelming air superiority, which the Allies later noted was a virtual necessity in their victory in WWII. Against this, the Finns had an army of 160,000 troops organised into units depending on their home region, a complete lack of mobile armour, and a minuscule amount of ancient WWI biplanes.

As soon as the first Soviet bombs fell on Helskini, President Kallio officially rejected Mannerheim's resignation he had days earlier agreed unofficially to accept, and Mannerheim was immediately appointed commander in chief. Knowing that Finland could not resist the Red Army for long, Field Marshal Mannerheim was counting on three options with fighting. Knowing the Russians could only successfully attack Finland around Lake Ladoga, as roads further north were brutally inadequate, Mannerheim knew that the Finns could oppose the Soviet forces there and delay them for a few weeks at the least. In this time, hopefully the West would see Finland's plight and come to its aid. Failing that, Stalin might see the stubborn fighting, and rather than be drawn into protracted warfare, settle for a negotiation that would still see a sovereign Finland. If these two options failed, the Finns would fight to the last man, last dollar and last bullet, sure to leave the name Finland in the annals of heroism, even if it did not exist as a country after the war.

Besides Mannerheim's realistic plan to allow Finland to continue as an independent state, issues of Soviet misunderstanding of the situation in Finland and intelligence would work in Finland's favour. The blitzkrieg style tactics worked well in the plains of Khalkin Gol and Poland, true, but that was a different story on the vast forests of Finland. Poor roads did not support a blitzkrieg, neither did communication centres deep behind the lines providing no objectives to capture for the Soviets. The Soviets did not think to paint their tanks white to camouflage against the snow until weeks into the campaign, and also didn't think to have adequate clothing for such a cold winter. The presence of tons of waste resources such as propaganda leaflets and state- of-the-art anti-tank guns that were useless against Finland's non existent tanks just as they were useless against pretty much anything else. The expected fifth column of communists within Finland never appeared, having emigrated to the USSR in the 30s, with the socialists that remained fighting alongside their brothers. What sounded easy on paper, was not going to be easy in real life.

"Since we civilians don't seem to be making any progress, maybe it's the soldier's turn to speak"

Molotov's ominous words should have warned the Finnish delegation sent to negotiate with the Soviets of Stalin's malicious intent if he did not get his way. But as bombs fell on Helsinki on the 30th of November and tanks rumbled over the border, President Kallio replaced the government that oversaw the negotiations with one that was prepared to seek negotiations to be reopened to stop the war that could destroy Finland. Ryti became the prime minister and ran all aspects of the war at the home front; Vaino Tanner became the foreign minister and dealt with the diplomatic side of the Winter War for Finland; and Field Marshal Mannerheim rarely left his command post, overseeing all aspects of the war on the battlefield. These three became a powerful ruling triumvirate during the Winter War. Every Finn had his part to play in fighting the Russians, but Finland would rise or fall on the decisions of these three men.

The Soviet Navy seized the four islands in the Finnish Gulf they had demanded in their negotiations without opposition. When they tried to take Hanko, the accurate artillery from fortified positions damaged some, and drove away all. As the year dragged on until late December, both Finnish and Soviet navies became useless in the conflict as the Gulf of Finland became a vast sheet of ice. Hanko was to remain in Finnish hands until the war was over.

The key to attacking and defending Finland was the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus. This eighty mile line of fortifications is strongest at the ends where the land meets the waters of the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga, and fixed coastal fortifications shoot high calibre cannons. Even with the cold winter, the ice on this part of Lake Ladoga was too weak to support heavy equipment, and ice on the Gulf of Finland cannot support it until late February, so outflanking the line is out of the question. The sector of the line containing the road which was the shortest route from Finland to Leningrad, known as the "Viipuri Gateway", contained ground hard in the freeze, ideal for mobile armour. The Red Army spent most of it's forces in the Karelian Isthmus, and found their technology were not the war winning devices they thought they were, and over time the Finns learnt how to counter in their own way. The Finns lent the name "Molotov cocktail" to the bottles of petrol with cloth stoppers that were lit and then thrown, used to counter the Soviet tanks. The tank hunter units using these homemade bombs had a high casualty rate - about 70 per cent - but there were plenty of Finns prepared to fight the Russians this way. Through the Soviet's misuse of their soldiers and armour, the Finns courage, and the use of night-time by the Finnish soldiers to rebuild the gaps in the line, with barbed wire, mines, tank blockades and the like. But Marshal Mannerheim and every Finn knew that over time, all three of these factors would change through change of Russian tactics, Finnish tiredness and lack of reinforcements.

Makeshift weaponry was not the only development to augment the Finnish soldier's lack of resources and manpower. The army also developed new tactics with time. One of the most popular was the motti tactics. In Finnish, a motti is a pile of wood with stakes holding it in place, which will eventually be cut up for firewood. The motti tactics was to approach and pin a Soviet column that adequate information has been gathered about. Then with a focus on concentration of firepower, the column would be attacked and divided into many isolated parts. The key was not to make the isolated part too large to put up a struggle which it can use to break out of the motti, or defend until Red Army reinforcements arrived. Then the mottis could be dealt with, beginning at the weakest, and cold, hunger and lack of supplies could weaken the stronger ones. This tactic was used to supplement the lack of ammunition, artillery and manpower the Finns had.

In the north of Finland's border with the USSR, guerilla tactics were the favoured method of fighting. What few roads there were, the Red Army stuck to them, for deviating into the forest was a sure death, whether to the terrible cold or a Finnish sniper. The invading soldiers were wholly unprepared for winter in the north: being too overloaded, too underdressed, and some Soviet citizens from warmer climates, such as Soviet central Asia, died in the cold of the north. The Finnish ski soldier is still the enduring image of the Winter War, even though the war was decided in the more conventional fighting on the Karelian Isthmus. At Suomussalmi, where Finnish ski guerillas destroyed two divisions of Soviets with little loss to themselves, was forged both the most popular victory of the Winter War outside of Finland as well as the enduring image of the ski soldier winning the Winter War. In reality, these victories did little in deciding the outcome of the war, and would have also been the case had the Soviets pulled off convincing victories. If anything, all they did was create false hopes in Western minds that free men can resist tyranny and win, which did not bode well for Field Marshal Mannerheim's plan to involve the West.

By far the most comical aspects of the Winter War was the Soviet propaganda that sought to convince Finland to accept it's "liberators". Stalin assigned Otto Kuusinen as the president of the "People's Republic of Finland", also known as the Terijoki government. Terijoki was the first villiage captured by the Russians, and the government was set up as a justification for war both to those within the USSR, as well as the rest of the world. To the USSR, Kuusinen immediately opened relations and promised all the points demanded by Stalin previously and more. To the Finns, Kuusinen promised an eight hour work day and land reform, but with an eight hour work day on the books for the last 20 years in Finland, and a progressive land program, the Finnish workers were not convinced. All could see, except for Stalin and Kuusinen themselves, that the Terijoki government was a farce. Stalin's justification was that he was not invading Finland, but responding to a foreign government's call for help against a rebel government's usurpation, quite the case of the Orwellian double-speak. If Stalin saw a need to justify to the West, there was a possiblity the West would get involved, or at least punish the USSR diplomatically in the war with Hitler to come..

Is the assault on the freedom of Finland and the dead women and children in their streets any less of a shock to us than the Nazi barbarities?"

Herbert Hoover spoke what was on people's mind all around the world, as the news of plucky little Finland's stance stirred people's emotions around the world. Volunteers flocked to Finland, 8,000 from Sweden, and smaller numbers from Denmark, Hungary and fascist Italy of all places. The 350 US volunteers arrived long after they could turn the tide. Governments sent material aid to Finland: outdated planes, ammunition, howitzers, tractors and uniforms; but helping was politically inconvenient. For Germany, helping would only be abrogating the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and Hitler did not want to do that just yet. England and France had Germany to worry about. Even the US government was reluctant to help while still trying to convince itself and others that it was against totalitarianism and for freedom: Congress eventually allowed 10 million in aid to go to Finland, but not to buy arms. Finland got around this easily, they bought surplus food and sold it to Britain, then used the cash from there to buy arms from the US. Because of the distances, logistics and strain on merchant shipping in 1939 and 1940, many of these shipments of aid did not get through until after the war.

Material aid was not the only thing governments did to try to stop the war, however all early alternatives fell short of military assistance. In the League of Nations, a discredited organization that had been seen to have no power since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the war between little Finland and huge Soviet Union was discussed. The demands of the countries furthest away from the conflict were the most condemning, whereas those closest were more lenient towards the USSR or neutrality. Like Japan and Italy previously, the USSR was eventually expelled from the League of Nation - a solution that did nothing to solving the problem or scaring the USSR into negotiations for peace.

The situation that was keeping foreign involvement from aiding Finland was sure to change in the winter of '39-'40. On the 5th of February, the French and British first declared their support for Finland and their desire to send 100,000 troops. The conditions placed upon this support when coupled with a realistic view of the international situation, as well as the possible outcomes, showed less that honourable motives. Both great powers demanded Finland ask for their help, and Sweden also allow passage through their country. Sweden was a neutral country, and violating her neutrality was as bad as the USSR had done to Finland's neutrality. There was also a suspicion that the majority of the troops would never reach Finland, as they would be sent to seize iron ore mines and ports which the German war machine needed to operate. Of those that would reach Finland, ground troops would be as useless in the winter conditions as the Russians. How the allied powers could most help with - modern aeroplanes and trained pilots - both Britain and France refused.

The outcome of British and French involvement did not seem likely, even though Finnish politicians could not admit in the face of public scrutiny that they did not desire that kind of help. The Finns asked Sweden for passage rights for the Allied force, Sweden refused by unanimous decision in parliament, but it was a show, Finland's diplomats would be annoyed if Sweden said yes. The British government would still be discussing the matter on the 12th of March, long after a decision could hope to reach Finland. Had this course been pursued, the Second World War would have occurred very differently, with the war being extended to Scandinavia, with France and Britain being against the USSR with Germany possibly helping until the time was right. These countries, of course, knew this. With France as the next large target in Germany's sight, an extension of the war over an Arctic Circle front would take some pressure off France. So over the course of the war, self interest guided the foreign government's attitude to Finland's plight, whereas the public's response was to the heroism and tragedy of these free men fighting against tyranny.

"We have won enough ground to bury our dead..."

On the 1st of February, Stalin was tiring of the charade in Finland. He had replaced Voroshilov with Timoshenko in orchestrating the fall of the tiny Baltic republic that had thus far refused to submit, and a large artillery barrage began on the Karelian Isthmus, the largest since the German barrage at Verdun in the Great War. 600,000 Soviet troops amassed near the Mannerheim line, and on the 6th of February, the final Russian offensive began. Finally the Finns fears had come true, the Red Army had learned from it's previous mistakes just when Finland's soldiers were at their most timed, and ammunition the most low. Massed coordinated armour assaulted the line, and by the 14th, Mannerheim was worried enough to personally view the situation himself at the front. He know that if a massed army was thrown at the Mannerheim Line long enough, Finland couldn't resist. Older fortifications of the Mannerheim Line were abandoned first, then the whole line altogether as the Finns retreated to the secondary defensive lines.

When peace negotiations were reopened, Soviet terms were harsher than November 1939. The city of Viipuri would be ceded to the Soviets, as all the land on the Karelian Isthmus and around Lake Ladoga. Over 400,000 Finnish refuges would need to be resettled after the war, some 12% of the population. Finland would lose the port of Petsamo, as well as strategic points in the Gulf of Finland. Economically, Finland would also lose out, it would lose farmland and vital timber industries on the Karelian Isthmus, 100 power stations, and numerous farms. Ashamed, the Finnish politicians had no choice but to sign. It was better than total subjugation. The peace terms were to come into effect at midday on the 13th of March, 1940. They would not be accepted easily by the people of Finland, as in the words of Vaino Tanner: "Peace has been restored, but what kind of peace? Henceforth our country will live as a mutilated nation". In the coming months, Finland's politicians would be walking on tenderhooks to resolve issues peacefully with an increasingly frustrating and frustrated Soviet Union.

On the German invasion on the 22nd of June, 1941, Finland sought to recapture it's losses from the Winter War by joining in attacking the Soviet Union, in what was known as the Continuation War. But while Hitler was keen to subjugate the people of the East, Finland captured their lost land, then proceeded to pay lip service to the Germans, not interested in conquest. The Finnish attack still played a part in Operation Barbarossa, it made the siege on Leningrad such a hungry, long and lean affair. In 1944, Finland signed a treaty with the USSR, and drove German soldiers out of the country in the Lappland War. Ironically, it was the Red Army's poor effort in the Winter War that convinced the Wehrmacht and the Nazis that the Soviet Union could not stand up and fight a smaller modern army on equal terms. The USSR gained more of a headache out of the war with Finland than the benefits that it demanded and received.

The human cost of the Winter War was almost a million men on the Soviet side, estimated by Khrushchev. For Finland, the cost seems considerably less, 25,000. This is quite harsh for a country of 4 million, and added to it are the refugees that needed to be given a place to stay in a Finland of less land than it began the war with, as well as the lost jobs from the ceded economies. But through all this, Finland would remain independent, and would be a tale of heroism and courage in the face of death for a long time to come.

Further reading

William R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40
Eloise Engle & Lauri Paananen, The Winter War: The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War
http://www.feldgrau.com/wwar.html
http://www.winterwar.com/mainpage.htm

Sources: Feldgrau, A Frozen Hell, The Battles of the Winter War, The Winter War, Wikipedia.

Photographs

Russian T-26 light tanks and T-20 Komsomolets armored tractors advancing into Finland during the Winter War, 2 Dec 1939Finnish Army Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo receiving a briefing during the Battle of Suomussalmi, Finland, Dec 1939-Jan 1940 Finnish Army machine gun crew during the Winter War, 1939-1940; note Maxim M32/33 machine gunRussian BT-5 tank in Finland during the Winter War, 1939-1940
See all 12 photographs of The Winter War



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Visitor Submitted Comments

  1. Anonymous says:
    21 Apr 2007 09:51:29 PM

    I like those Finnish ski soldiers. Speeding down the hill, shoot the Soviets with machine guns, then ride the ski lift back to the top and do it again!
  2. Anonymous says:
    17 Sep 2009 12:06:08 PM

    That is not how it happened.

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More on The Winter War
Participant(s):
» Airo, Aksel
» Budėnny, Semėn
» Mannerheim, Carl G. E.
» Siilasvuo, Hjalmar
» Timoshenko, Semyon

Ship Participant(s):
» Ilmarinen
» Kirov


The Winter War Photo Gallery
Russian T-26 light tanks and T-20 Komsomolets armored tractors advancing into Finland during the Winter War, 2 Dec 1939
See all 12 photographs of The Winter War



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Famous WW2 Quote
"Since peace is now beyond hope, we can but fight to the end."

Chiang Kaishek, 31 Jul 1937