Invasion of the Philippine Islands
Contributor: C. Peter Chen
At the start of WW2, the Philippine Islands were United States territory as per the 1898 Treaty of Paris. The archipelago was home to 19 million people, and was at a strategic location between Japan and the South Pacific. Because of the importance, the retired Army General Douglas MacArthur, currently serving as a Field Marshal in the Filipino military, was called back into service by President Franklin Roosevelt, and was given resources to mobilize Philippine defenses in case of a Japanese attack. MacArthur was given US$10 million and 100 B-17 Flying Fortress Bombers. MacArthur deployed most of his defenses on the islands of Luzon and Mindanao, forming what he called "key or base point of the US defense line". The day after the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese would test MacArthur's statement (though the attack was supposed to happen near-simultaneously; a heavy fog in Formosa delayed Japanese attack).
In the American capital of Washington, Henry Stimson and George Marshall believed that a strong presence of American air power in the Philippine Islands would discourage Japanese aggression. On 15 Nov 1941, George Marshall proudly said in a press conference that "the greatest concentration of heavy bomber strength anywhere in the world" were gathered at the Philippine Islands, ready to not only counterattack any attacks on the islands but also to strike at the Japanese home islands and set the "paper" cities of Japan on fire. When a reporter noted that the B-17 bombers lacked the range necessary for a round trip between Clark Field in Philippine Islands and the Japanese capital of Tokyo, Marshall indicated air fields at Vladivostok would be shared by the friendly Russian government. Marshall would grossly overestimate Russia's friendliness. When the Japanese planes appeared at the horizons, Major General Lewis Brereton's pilots were recovering from a night of partying at the Hotel that served as MacArthur's residence. In fact, the B-17 crew of the 27th Bombardment group were supposed to take their bombers southward to Mindanao, outside of Japanese attack range, but the crew decided to delay that order for several days in anticipation of this party in Brereton's honor. When the party ended at 2am Manila time, it was 0800 hours at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii when the first Japanese aircraft dropped their torpedos, and General Yamashita's 25th Army were en route to British Malaya.
MacArthur anticipated Japanese aggression as early as late Nov 1941 when Japanese scouts were seen in northern Luzon frequently. In early Dec, Japanese bomber formations were observed flying within 20 miles of Lingayen Gulf beaches and returning to Formosa, presumably making trial runs in preparation for the attack. The actual attack came several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack, when Japanese air strikes destroyed half of MacArthur's air force on the ground. The Japanese army followed in three landing sites. 76 transport ships landed the 48th Division at Lingayen and the 16th Division at Lamon Bay, while the third landing was at Mindanao at the south of Luzon. The primary objectives of the land troops were to take airstrips so that they could continuously extend air superiority as they moved south.
In Washington on 14 Dec, Chief of Staff Marshall, who had not seen the Philippine Islands since he was a first lieutenant in Manila in 1915, summoned Brigadier General Dwight Eisenhower to assess the situation. Eisenhower told Marshall, essentially, to abandon the archipelago for the time being:
Three airstrips at Luzon were taken very quickly, while the Lingayen Gulf region fell on 22 Dec. As an open city Manila fell quickly, giving Japan the use of the naval bases at Manila Bay. The troops who landed at Mindanao marched toward Davao, which was captured on 20 Dec. A seaplane base was immediately set up at Davao to provide local air superiority, then Davao was being set up as the base of operations further south. The Japanese landing force only consisted of 57,000 men, but it had little difficulty fighting American and Filipino forces. While Japanese troops advanced across Luzon, President Manuel Quezon of the Philippines requested President Roosevelt to grant the Philippine Islands their independence so that he could announce Philippine neutrality. Quezon's 8 Feb message said that:
Despite the harsh truth told from his Filipino counterpart, Franklin Roosevelt refused the request for independence and neutrality. Partly, Roosevelt turned down the request knowing the Japanese would not acknowledge such a late statement of neutrality. However, he did grant MacArthur the permission to surrender Filipino troops (but not Americans).
Immediately following capturing key cities, naval bases, and airstrips, nine ships with 4,000 troops departed from the main Philippine Islands for Jolo of the Sulu archipelago on 22 Dec. Jolo would fall on Christmas Day, 25 Dec, providing a forward base for supporting the attacks on Borneo. Another seaplane base was also set up at Jolo to form local air superiority.
It was surprising that with MacArthur predicting the attack to take place (though he thought the attacks would come later, in spring of 1942) down to the accurate prediction of Japanese landing sites, MacArthur was unable to react properly to the Japanese attacks. MacArthur was said to be in shock, unable to give commands to his staff officers. When he finally got himself together, he ordered troops to resist the Japanese at the landing sites, which Lieutenant Harold Johnson (later chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) called a "tragic error". Johnson believed that, in hindsight, instead of putting the inexperienced Filipino soldiers at the beaches only to be routed by the Japanese, they could have had been transporting food and other supplies to Corregidor where they would be badly needed later on. Some historians believed that the stockpiling of supplies on Bataan should had been done even earlier, for the retreat to the Bataan Peninsula had been in the design of the "Rainbow 5" plan all along.There were discrepancies in regards to the orders given to the bombers present in the Philippine Islands. According to Brereton, he requested immediate bombing missions to attack Formosa to discourage further Japanese air strikes, and blamed Sutherand, MacArthur's Chief of Staff, for not giving the authorization to do so. According to Sutherland, however, he did authorize the bombers to launch, but it was Brereton who delayed the action as he had little intelligence on Formosa and did not know where to strike.
With Japanese forces bearing down on Manila, MacArthur ordered his North Luzon Force to fight a delay-action campaign, confronting the Japanese advance troops and slowly retrograding as they destroyed key bridges. The US 26th Cavalry Regiment, also known as the Philippine Scouts, performed admirably as rearguards. The unit was, for the most part, led by American officers but manned by Filipino troops. Fighting on horseback, they disrupted Japanese advances by attacking swiftly and surprisingly, and withdraw with speed before the Japanese counterattacked. On 16 Jan, troops of the Philippine Scouts performed the last cavalry charge in American military history. Troop F under the command of Lieutenant Ramsey was given the order to secure the village of Morong. They were surprised to discover that the Japanese were entering the village from the other side when the American-Filipino force arrived. Without thinking, Ramsey ordered his troops to charge forward. Stumping horses and point-blank shooting drove off the larger Japanese force, and they held the ground for some time before falling back toward Bataan.
Meanwhile, the South Luzon Force marched toward the Bataan Peninsula with the goal to unite the two forces together for a stand-off at the island of Corregidor. "Again and again, these tactics would be repeated. Stand and fight, slip back and dynamite", MacArthur would note after the war in his memoirs, describing the delay-action retrograde maneuver performed by the North Luzon Force to provide time for South Luzon Force to march northward. MacArthur's hard-drinking General Jonathan Wainwright performed the maneuvers perfectly, succeeding in delaying the advancing Japanese troops under the command of Homma.
After MacArthur's troops retreated across the Bataan to Corregidor, under Washington's orders he left for Australia on 22 Feb 1942. He mistook Washington's intention (and Washington allowed him to misinterpret the messages) that when he reached Australia he would be greeted by a major American army, and he would be able to lead this army and return to the Philippines right away. There was no army, in fact, Australia did not even have enough defenses to protect itself. Upon arrival at Australia, he made the following note to journalists:
Though rather casually noted, "I shall return" became the powerful symbol which was the spiritual center of Filipino resistance. "It was scraped in the sands of the beaches, it was daubed on the walls of the barrios, it was stamped on the mail, it was whispered in the cloisters of the church", recalled MacArthur. "It became the battle cry of a great underground swell that no Japanese bayonet could still."
On Bataan, the American soldiers felt they were abandoned by their own government to fight a war on their own. "We are the battling bastards of Bataan," they mocked, "no papa, no mama, no Uncle Sam." Nevertheless, they fought valiantly. "They asked no quarter and they gave none.... They were filthy, and they were lousy, and they stank. And I loved them", noted MacArthur.
Japanese atrocities started even before Corregidor was conquered. United States Marine officer Lieutenant Michael Dobervich, a prisoner of war in the Philippine Islands, remembered his treatment.
As Lieutenant Dobervich would put it, "words cannot describe the conditions (of the camp)". Dobervich's experience was part of the Bataan Death March, a sixty mile march forced upon captured Filipino and American soldiers. 14,000 died during the march down the peninsula, and thousands more in the camps such as the one Dobervich was kept in.
The last of the Americans held their ground until 5 May when Wainwright finally surrendered to the Japanese.
Sources: American Caesar, the Pacific Campaign, Reminiscences, Wikipedia, World War II Plus 55, World War II US Cavalry Units.
Photographs
![]() | ![]() | ![]() | ![]() |
| If you have enjoyed this article, you may also be intererested in: Aleutian Islands Campaign Battle of Rabaul First Battle of Makin |
Visitor Submitted Comments
All visitor submitted comments are opinions of those making the submissions and do not reflect views of WW2DB.
» Homma, Masaharu
» Ihara, Mitsugo
» Isawa, Yutaka
» MacArthur, Douglas
» Quezon, Manuel
» Sakai, Saburo
» Shiraichi, Kayutaka
» Vargas, Jorge
» Wainwright, Jonathan
Ship Participant(s):
» Arashio
» Ashigara
» Atago
» Chitose
» Kuma
» Maya
» Minegumo
» Murasame
» Myoko
» Nagara
» Natori
» PT-class
» Ryujo
» Sealion
» Suzukaze
» Takao
» Yukikaze
» Zuiho
Document(s):
» Interrogation Nav 15, Captain Chihaya Takahashi
» Interrogation Nav 17, Captain Kawakita Ishihara
» Interrogation Nav 68, Captain Mitsugo Ihara
» Interrogation Nav 7, Vice Admiral Kayutaka Shiraichi
Related Books:
» American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964
» World War II US Cavalry Units: Pacific Theater
![]() |


Advertise on ww2db.com
- » 580 biographies
- » 238 events
- » 550 ships
- » 218 aircraft models
- » 120 vehicle models
- » 213 weapon models
- » 41 historical documents
- » 168 book reviews
- » 9454 photos, 1026 in color
Lt. Gen. Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, at Guadalcanal




8 Jun 2005 02:52:56 AM
You see, you forgot the HUKBALAHAP.
2 May 2006 11:30:23 PM
A must read to the young generations of Filipinos @ Americans who now enjoy freedom
22 Aug 2006 02:50:10 PM
some times it makes a person think did usa have knowledge of attack on pearl harbor
28 Sep 2006 05:27:13 PM
what lessons could be drawn from the battle and fall of Bataan?(include the death march)
how effective was the guerilla movement against the japanese?
how did the japanese treat the filipinos? what where the filipinos impressions on the japanese?
evaluate japanese policies implemented in the philippines
how did the filipinos react on the outbreak of war?
how important was the philippines to the japanese?
7 Dec 2006 01:42:57 PM
My Dad (Raymond T. Moran, AOC USN) was in VP102 during the invasion. It was a blessing that he was one of the few that got out. He received the Presential Unit Citation for the defense of the Philippines. Im very proud of him and would love to talk to any of his shipmates.
11 Mar 2007 11:17:52 AM
Is there any data on Japanese casualties as they took the Philippines during 1942. Since Us forces held out for over 5 months, we must have inflicted heavy casualties but I can find no valid figures.
31 Mar 2007 10:28:18 PM
My grandfather James I Cragett drove tank in the Phillipeans Im trying to learn more about him
5 May 2007 01:20:50 AM
Hi:
If the US $ 50 million, which the Filipino people owned, had been released a year or even much earlier, as President Manuel Quezon had asked, the Philippine Army could have been better equipped and prepared.
The Philippine Army was poorly trained and equipped, no thanks to American do-gooders in the late 1930s who lobbied for the rejection of President Quezons request.
The US $ 50 million had something to do with sugar tariffs whose possession was dtermined by the US Supreme Court in 1947.
The 1930s peaceniks, along with Philippine Governor General Francis Sayre, have until now not given an explanation why they opposed the giving of this money.
So many died, Filipinos and Americans as a result.
10 May 2007 02:12:38 PM
Note on the quality of the filippino army- it would have been stupid of us to train and arm their army because the filippinos hates americans due to the way we took over
18 Sep 2007 06:48:04 AM
Rations for the beseiged US Marines on Corregedor were skimpy in the extreme. Just one 8 ounce can of corned beef was provided to feed ten men per day at the height of ther seige. Sometimes Japanese Air raids would bring dead fish to the surface which could supplement their meagre diet. Some soldiers would even risk shark or Zero attacks to reach stricken boats in an attempt to locate more supplies.
Anxious to bring in a floating crate, one Marine swam out to sea and struggled back triumphantly with his prize. When the crate was opened it was found to contain four gallon jars or ink. Whilst he trying to exchange these for food a piece of flying shrapnel destroyed two of the jars. A Mess sergeant had to clean up the resultant mess.
27 Oct 2007 01:59:48 PM
In response to the inquiry regarding Japanese casualty figures during the entire 1941-42 campaign to conquer the Philippines, particularly Bataan and Corregidor:
I have no exact figures either, but they were indeed heavy, so much so that Homma had to ask for reinforcements to shore up his force besieging the Americans and Filipino soldiers on Bataan. They suffered every bit from your typical diseases like malaria, dengue fever, and dystentery as did their enemies, and coupled with the stubborn resistance of the Americans and Filipinos, played a role in delaying the Japanese advance. Because of the stalled offensive and undoubtably horrendous casualties suffered, Homma would eventually be relieved of his command by higher-ups as soon as Corregidor fell.
1 Nov 2007 01:17:22 PM
What was accomplished by going to war ?
13 Nov 2007 05:41:53 AM
McArthur correctly predicted the Japanese attack but did not prepare well for the war. His planes were caught napping on the ground depsite knowing about Pearl Harbor. Senseless.
20 Dec 2007 09:03:19 PM
In response to the comment about the quality of the filipino army, please take care in expressing revisionist opinions contrary to fact. The filipinos who risked their lives to offer a cup of water along the Bataan Death March route are worthy of honor, as are the observations of men who were there and consider the Philippine Scouts some of the best jungle fighters of the war. My father was there on Bataan and Corregidor please respect the other men who stood with him.
26 Sep 2008 04:15:19 AM
FILPINO rock!!! i salute to all of you
30 Nov 2008 02:56:17 AM
as history of any american war, americans are always for their personal interest. gulf war, korean war etc... they are always for their interest. have the americans think that if filipino souldiers are not in there side, can they beat the **** .. nfilipino are great fighters, life maybe at stake but for the sake of their country they fight.. my salute to my filipino forefathers who gave me freedom.....
16 Jan 2009 06:48:51 AM
May the solders live on in memory
1 Feb 2009 09:17:57 PM
The Filipinos fought even though they weren't well trained. Even the women help in hospitals, even though the Japanese raped them. The Battles in the Philippines don't really get enough recognition as they deserve. My Mom got raped in the war, and my Uncle died as a Guerilla. All the Filipinos that helped in some way, shape, or form, deserve the uptmost respect.
28 Mar 2009 07:41:31 AM
my grandmother's brother sgt. gaudencio andrade fought in the defense of cotabato in mindanao. he was so traumatized by his experience. having to dodge machinegun bullets from a japanese aircraft he, together with an american captain and a filipino lt. ran across no man's land to relay the order to abandon the defense of the mindanao river near the town of cotabato. he suffered what is now known as post traumatic stress disorder.. after the war, he wrote the u.s. embassy in manila, requesting for assistance to reconstruct the records of his military service under uncle sam. in a reply, the us govt decllined his request, stating that his name was not among u.s. and filipino troops who fought under u.s. command in the phil. this non-recognition of his service strikes a raw nerve in me and other relatives who saw how he sufferred under the effects of the trauma he went thru during the war. the u.s. eventually passed a law recognizing the service of filipino troops only this year, many years after the death of many of those who fought the **** under u.s. command in world war 2. is there a way to check the roster of filipino units attached to u.s. army in mindanao during 1941 to 42, particularly of those who fought in the defense of cotabato? this might just help us rectify the records of our relative who was burried without military honors, and now lies in a simple grave in south cotabato.
1 Jun 2009 10:01:40 PM
Gen Masaharu Homma occupied Manila in just two weeks following the main landings at Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay. On the 1st of Jan 42 he dispatched only a single regiment to follow Field Marshal MacArthur's 100,000 man army across the Pampanga River and into Bataan while 2 divisions and supporting elements occupied Manila on January 2. Manila and not the destruction of MacArthur's band of ragged refugees was the objective of the 14th Army (IJA) in early January. The best of Homma's infantry and most of his airpower was transferred to the invasion of Java just as the fight in Bataan began. The Japanese planned to try to take Bataan with the 65th Brigade an untrained and poorly equippted conscript unit formed in Formosa. General Nara, commander of the 65th complained the brigade was not competent for combat. The high command in Tokyo was willing to delay final destruction of MacArthur's army to speed up the conquest of Java. The force remaining to Homma ws able to drive the Filamericans off their primary line and back to the reserve line. About Feb 8th Homma decided to cease offensive action and wait for reinforcements. After Java fell the Japanese shipped some good troops back to the Philippines and began the final assault on Good Friday, April 3rd. In about 5 days of fighting the reinforced 14th army smashed the starving disease ridden Filamerican line in front of Mt Samat and virtually all resistance along the II Corps front collapsed. With food supplies exhausted and his hospitals exposed, Major General Edward P. King, commander of Bataan Force, disobeyed orders from MacArthur in Australia and surrendered early on the morning of April 9th rather than undertake the ordered suicidal attack to break out to Oglongapo. The Japanese also suffered greater losses to disease and malnutrition than to enemy action, but they were able to ship in replacements after the conquest of Borneo and the Dutch East Indies. I respect all of them Filipinos, Japanese, and Americans who suffered and sacrificed in a tropical hell of malnutrition and malaria for a causes they believed in. After the surrender there were parades in Manila in front of MacArthur's old quarters at the Manila Hotel to celebrate the Japanese victory. While tens of thousands of POWs were marched to Camp O'Donnel under horrendous conditions, the senior Japanese officers were toasted at dinner in the old American Army-Navy Club.
2 Sep 2009 09:45:50 AM
I understand the 27th BG was awarded a number of Presidential Unit Citations, and the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation for service in the Battle of Bataan, and Corregidor during 1941, and early 1942.
Interested in identifying the General Orders numbers, and dates. Can anyone assist?
3 Sep 2009 01:57:23 PM
>Interested in identifying the General Orders numbers, and dates.
Identified, and dates obtained.
My question is why is there no support recently for American participants of the battle?
Records reveal since 2003, the Army Awards Branch refuses to follow guidelines pertaining to WWII, and history of awards to members of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, II Corps.
I have a 25 page description of the unit's involvement fighting the enemyas combat infantrymen. The author was an infantry lieutenant platoon leader.
Yet, members and/or next of kin of veterans are experiencing denials to their requests for the Combat Infantryman Badge contrary to the guidelines and the UCMJ, Article 92. Failure to Obey Order or Regulation.
Where is the support Americans?
Robert
3 Sep 2009 02:03:27 PM
Robert Rebucan,
Are you able to share more information?
sgt. gaudencio
First name?
Serial number or
unit?
Robert
Robersabel@aol.com
3 Oct 2009 05:56:09 PM
what are the experiences of the Filipinos during he oppression?
You didn't put idiots!!!!!!!!!!
4 Oct 2009 02:07:44 PM
when mcarthur return to the philippines japanese army were almost beaten by the filipino guerillas..thats why during the end of war you can hardly see a big battles with the japanese
21 Apr 2010 08:56:36 AM
I recently had the honour to visit Corrigedor. It is being kept up and turned almost into a shrine. Not just for Filipinos, Americans but for Japanese as well. I was very impressed.