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With Japan controlling nearly the entire western half of the Pacific, Japan's first phase of the Pacific War plan was coming to a conclusion. The next phase consisted of creating a defense buffer so that Japan would be free to transport materiel within these borders. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was driven by two reasons to establish a foothold at the Midway Atoll. First, the establishment of forward bases at Midway would expand this border of defense just far enough so that an attack like the one James Doolittle had pulled off would not occur easily again. Admiral Osami Nagano was personally dumbfounded by this surprise attack, observed to be murmuring "this shouldn't happen, this just should not happen" immediately after hearing the explosions in Tokyo, and Yamamoto and other officers swore to make sure that it would not happen again. Secondly, knowing American carriers were operating somewhere near the Hawaiian Islands, Yamamoto wanted to finish off what Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo could not do for him at Pearl Harbor.

Yamamoto's plan was not supported by everyone, however. The Imperial General Headquarters and the top Navy brass looked more so toward the south Pacific as the next step of conquest, looking to seal off Australia, a potential American base, by pushing toward New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa. The Japanese Army, also, was weary of any advance by the Navy that could demand more men as garrison troops; the Army was already feeling the pressure from the ever-draining Second Sino-Japanese War, and knew that by the conquest of more islands, demand for manpower and the accompanying demand for supplies could only increase. Nevertheless, through political intrigue and diplomacy, Yamamoto secured permission from Admiral Nagano on 5 Apr 1942 to proceed with Operation MI, a plan to conquer the Midway Atoll. Nagano, though intimidated by Yamamoto to give permission for such an attack, got one of his wishes through in the plan as well. Nagano, on behalf of the Naval General Headquarters, demanded for Operation AL, an operation to capture the Aleutian Islands in Alaska as means to delay any possible American invasion of the Kurile Islands from that direction. Additionally, with proposed seaplane bases with range of 200 to 300 miles out of each location and the naval patrol between them, it would become harder for any shipping to slip through the Northern Pacific, whether it was convoys for eastern Russia or another attack on Japan. The possibility of using the Aleutian Islands and Midway as staging point for a future attack on the remainder of the Hawaiian Islands was discussed; there were no discussions for further attacks into Alaska.

Originally planned for a launch before Operation MI, on 16 Apr Nagano conceded to Yamamoto that Operation AL was to take place at the same time as Operation MI in order to maintain strategic surprise in north and central Pacific. Originally opposing the Aleutian Islands addition to his plan, Yamamoto delegated the entire planning of Operation AL to Captain Kameto Kuroshima.

As shown by the lengths Yamamoto had to go through to acquire permission for the Midway operation, a lack of cohesiveness could be sensed from the top commanders in Japan. With the introduction of Operation AL, the invasion plan suddenly grew exponentially in scope. The original field of battle covering the entire chain of the Hawaiian Archipelago at 1,500 nautical miles was already large. With the inclusion of the Aleutian Islands, the battle zone was expanded into a huge 1,500nm by 1,650nm area. The seemingly invincible Combined Fleet's records at this moment perhaps instilled just enough arrogance in Yamamoto to continue on with his planning, though in hindsight his planning was overly complex and perhaps even doomed from the beginning. One major critique in modern times was the distance in which each task force traveled. Nagumo's main attack force containing four fleet carriers spearheaded the northern approach, nominally supported by the main battle force containing seven battleships, two light cruisers, and 12 destroyers headed personally by Yamamoto; several light carriers and seaplane tenders was also present with Yamamoto's command fleet. The phrase "nominally supported" was used because the main battle force was traveling 300 nautical miles behind Nagumo's fleet, therefore actually impossible to directly support Nagumo's ships if it was necessary. The Midway occupation transports headed by Nobutake Kondo and his support fleets of two battleships and various supporting ships approached from the south in three separate groups. The three task forces of the southern approach sailed closer together compared to the main attack force in the north, and they were spearheaded by a smaller fourth group in charge of minesweeping. If managing the numerous task groups over wide distances did not set off a warning flag to the reader, the plans for early warning sure would. Two cordons of early detection set up by submarines were planned, one to the north of the archipelago and another to the southwest, tasked with scouting for the American carriers that Yamamoto wished to lure out and destroy. While good on paper, the submarine positioning was ineffective. The shortcomings in the positioning actually was proven during a 25 May war game, where Japanese officers playing the part of the American fleet took a course that completely bypassed both cordons and critically damaging multiple Japanese carriers in one shift strike. Yamamoto, however, claimed such a movement was impossible; the chief of the Combined Fleet was already tired of the endless bickering among his peers, and chose to completely ignore this omen instead of tweaking his plan. The final weakness in Yamamoto's plan was regarding the strengths of the air units aboard Nagumo's carriers. By the middle of 1942, the combined efforts of Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and Aichi to supply Japan with aircraft were already falling behind the rate of losses despite endless Japanese victories. Nagumo's four carriers carried 267 aircraft only a half year before; for Midway, only 227 were found aboard the carriers. Even if one was generously adding the miscellaneous crafts found aboard various capital ships and aircraft tenders in the invasion fleet, Nagumo still only had 248 aircraft at his disposal. When compared to the 412 aircraft used for the Pearl Harbor attack, this was an awfully small quantity, especially considering Yamamoto's wish for Midway to become the decisive battle that would bring down the American carriers.

Then, of course, were the similarly complex plans to invade the Aleutian Islands in the far north. The Aleutian Islands assault team consisted of two light carriers, two heavy cruisers, and destroyers. Submarines were also deployed between 7 to 10 days before the invasion to act as advance scouts over the entire north Pacific. The submarines assigned to reconnaissance duties focused on Adak, Attu, Kiska, and Amchitka.

"The end result was the greatest concentration of naval tonnage since the British battle fleet at Jutland, the largest assemblage of sea power to ever sail under the Japanese flag, the biggest yet seen in the Pacific Ocean and the most powerful in all history", said historian Dan van der Vat.

On the American side, intelligence expert Joseph Rochefort knew that a major Japanese strike would take place somewhere in the north Pacific, and he deducted that the Japanese target, "AF". However, not all top US Navy brass agreed with his deductions, and Rochefort had to find proof. Rochefort's assistant Lieutenant Commander Jasper Holmes came up with the plan for the personnel at Midway, in unencrypted radio signals, to announce that Midway (which had not natural fresh water) was out of fresh water, and to request supplies of it; Rochefort knew that if this scheme succeeded in getting a Japanese response, he would be able to convince his superiors. Luck struck a short time later. The Japanese message "AF is short of water" was intercepted, advising the Midway invasion planners to take along additional supplies of fresh water. With this information, Admiral Chester Nimitz finally agreed with Rochefort's theories and recalled William Halsey and Frank Fletcher's respective carrier task forces to the Hawaiian Islands, with Midway as its northwestern-most member. The American forces were ordered to Point Luck about 300 nautical miles northeast of where Nagumo's carriers would most likely launch their aircraft. While exposed to enemy attack without the ability to immediately call upon Midway's land-based planes for assistance, the American fleet was also able to possibly flank the Japanese carriers should the Americans achieve a successful ambush. As the American carriers sailed toward the Point Luck rendezvous point, no warnings came from the northern Japanese submarine cordon, simply because it was not there as planned. By the time the Japanese submarines arrived at their patrol locations on 3 Jun, two days behind the original plan, the American fleets had already sailed through the area. Coupled with failed scouting efforts of Pearl Harbor by Japanese seaplanes (Operation K), the Americans would enjoy an advantage even before the battle started: The Japanese was fighting against an enemy in which they had little concrete information of.

Of course, the Americans were not exactly in full confidence of their intelligence. For one, Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, at the time of the Battle of Midway an intelligence officer based at Pearl Harbor, later noted that the Americans had no idea of the scope and scale of the Japanese attack; Nimitz, he said, for example, did not have Battleship Divisions 1 and 2 among his dispatched forces, reflecting that the Americans had little clue of the composition of the Japanese Midway invasion fleet, which included the most powerful surface fleet the world had yet seen. As the battle turned out, Yamamoto would never use the powerful surface fleet; had history played out differently, however, this failure of intelligence would certainly work against the Americans.

At Midway, constructions lasted through the entire days, rushing the building of trenches and fortifications against the invasion. The defense task was given to the Sixth Defense Battalion under the command of Colonel Harold D. Shannon. A hundred flights daily were detected by Japanese submarine I-168, indicating that the Marines detachment on Midway were preparing against an impending invasion. Why this observation did not tip off Yamamoto and Nagumo that the Americans knew what they were planning was unsure.

In the morning of 3 Jun, Ensign Jack Reid of VP-21 took off on his aerial patrol. At the extent of his range, he detected unidentified radio chatter, and decided to go further. He was rewarded with sighting Kondo's force at about 0900. He dropped to about 500 feet in altitude as he approached, pulled up to 1,000 feet to observe for a short period of time (and noted six large ships), and then dropped to 500 feet again, tracking Kondo's fleet for several hours despite being shot at several times. The US Navy officers made a mistake at this point, identifying this fleet as the main Japanese force. Captain Cyril T. Simard, commander at Midway, dispatched 19 US Army B-17 Flying Fortress bombers to attack Kondo's fleet with 600-lb and 500-lb demolition bombs. They found the Japanese force at 1623 and attacked, and the bombs failed to detonate anywhere near the ships. They enthusiastically reported damaging a battleship and a heavy cruiser, going as far as describing their victims as "motionless" and "issuing huge clouds of dark smoke", but that was not correct. Several PBY-5A Catalina aircraft did, however, damage oiler Akebone Maru with torpedoes.

The American forces first found the actual Japanese main attack force, the carrier group, at 0503 in the morning of 4 Jun 1942 when Lieutenant Howard P. Ady, Jr. in a PBY Catalina aircraft sighted a Japanese aircraft. At 0540, he found Nagumo's force, and at 0552 he reported finding "two carriers and main body of ships, carriers in front". Lieutenant (jg) William E. Chase made the second report at 0544, "[m]any planes heading Midway". At 0630 Midway time, bombs were falling on Midway by 108 attacking Japanese aircraft launched from Nagumo's carriers. US Marine Corps fighters bravely fought the attackers, but the more advanced Zeroes made the defensive efforts difficult. Commander John Ford, with a camera in hand at that time, recalled a moment in this phase of the attack:

The attack on Midway was conducted according to plan. Level bombers made their run first, then the dive bombers led by Kaga's Ogawa Shoichi swooped in. Visibility was not perfect, and a full array of defensive weapons including flak and automatic weapons created hazards for the attackers. The anti-aircraft fire was much more accurate and deadly than what the Japanese pilots expected, though they were able to destroy many facilities, including several fuel storage tanks and a power generator. The damage was heavy, but by no means critical enough to put Midway out of action, and the leader of the attack Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga knew it. The Japanese attack on the island itself was over by 0715. 17 out of 26 Marine planes were shot down by the escorting Zero fighters. On the Japanese side, 11 aircraft were lost, with another 14 heavily damaged (not all of the heavily damaged would make it home safely). At the end of this attack wave, Nagumo lost about 20% of his carriers' strength.

Captain Simard then launched the first American attack with six Avenger bombers; at the same time four Army Marauder bombers were also launched. Due to the lack of communications between the Navy Avengers and the Army Marauders, the Americans failed to combine their strengths during this attack. Instead, the Avengers fought the Hiryu, while the Marauders headed for the Akagi. With a combination of the slow American torpedoes and excellent Japanese maneuvers, this first American attack completely failed at the cost of most of the planes (only three air crafts out of 10 returned). Commander Kawaguchi Susumi of the Hiryu recalled:

The carrier Hiryu actually reported that she simply outmaneuvered many of the slow American torpedoes.

At the advice of Tomonaga, Nagumo ordered for a second wave of attack on the island. The planes were in the hangars armed with anti-ship weapons based on Yamamoto's orders, and with Nagumo's executive decision the crew were busy unloading the torpedoes and loading them with heavier bombs instead that are better suited for land targets. Unexpectedly, Nagumo received a report from a reconnaissance plane that an American fleet was discovered. Halfway through the re-arming, Nagumo ordered all re-arming process below decks stopped while he demanded more intelligence. The reconnaissance plane that first found the American fleet was cruiser Tone's seaplane running search line #4 at 100-degrees from the carrier fleet (although had everything been going exactly according to plans, it should had been search line #5 by cruiser Chikuma that would spot the American ships); however, the ships were reported to be mostly surface ships, which gave Nagumo a false sense of temporary security.

During this time, Major Lofton Henderson led 16 Marine dive-bombers on an attack on the Hiryu. No hits were scored, and eight air crafts were lost, including Henderson's own. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Sweeney's 15 B-17s dropped sixty tons of bombs on the Occupation Force fleet, but scored no hits either. Later, another attack was launched. Major Benjamin Norris' 11 Vindicator bombers dropped their bombs at the battleship Haruna, but again scored no hits. Lieutenant Commander John Waldron's attack with Devastator aircraft were equally ineffective. Thus far, American resistance against the Japanese attack was fairly useless, and the casualty rates were extremely high. Out of 51 torpedo bombers dispatched, for instance, only 7 had returned. However, the failed attacks had not been committed in vain. The constant attacks on the individual carriers, however ineffective as they had been individually, accomplished the most important task of the entire battle: keeping the Japanese carriers busy launching and recovery CAP (combat air patrol) fighters. With the flight decks busy with CAP operations, the Japanese simply could not find the opportunity to gather a well-balanced attack force to attack the American fleet. So in a sense, the battle was over the first moment American aircraft made contact with the Japanese carriers.

Admiral Fletcher, receiving reports of the Japanese attack on Midway, calculated his options. While his carriers were still further away than he had hoped to be, an earlier launch could catch the Japanese planes re-fueling and re-arming. He decided to launch an attack led by Lieutenant Commander Clarence McClusky. After waves of waves of failed American attacks, finally this wave started to see some results. At this time, Japanese CAP fighters protecting the carriers were in disarray; they were not given the chance to regroup after they triumphantly destroyed the previous waves of American attacks. This gave the new American attackers a chance to strike at the carriers without getting through a fighter screen first. The Akagi took two bomb hits at 1026, tearing into below decks. The most damaging hit on Akagi came in the form of a near miss by Ensign Frederick Thomas Weber, which jammed the ship's port rudder, rendering her essentially unnavigable. Initially refusing to leave the ship, Admiral Nagumo was finally convinced by Captain Taijiro Aoki to transfer his flag to another ship after explaining to the admiral that commanding a fleet would be impossible on a burning ship without working radio; they transferred to the light cruiser Nagara. Kaga was hit four times, including one that wiped out the bridge; she was a sailing inferno as bomb stores exploded and gasoline burned. Soryu met with similar attacks as well, hit by dive bombers and later came under fire by submarine USS Nautilus; she sank at 1913. Kaga followed at 1925, about three hours after abandon ship order was given. Akagi remained afloat until 0200 the next morning when she was scuttled.

Ensign George Gay, a downed American pilot, floated in the water and witnessed the devastation upon Japanese carriers. "The carriers during the day resembled a very large oil-field fire.... The fire coming out of the forward and after end looked like a blowtorch, just roaring white flame and the oil burning.... Billowing big red flames belched out of this black smoke... and I was sitting in the water hollering hooray, hooray!"

USS Nautilus was arguably the only somewhat effective American submarine in the whole battle, despite the presence of Task Force 7's 19 submarines present at Midway. The US Navy's philosophy of submarines called for "the maximum number of potential torpedo hits and the maximum service of information to the Commander-in-Chief"; they failed at both. Of all the submarines deployed by Rear Admiral Robert English of the Submarine Force of the Pacific Fleet, only two or three fired torpedoes, and they did not hit anything. The failure of American submarines was mostly blamed on ineffective submarine design and the poor quality of torpedoes.

Ensign Wesley F. Osmus, who piloted a TBD Devastator against Soryu, was shot down and rescued by Japanese destroyer Arashi. Suffering only minor burns as reported by Arashi's doctor Lieutenant Katsukichi Ishizaka, he was interrogated for intelligence, which included information regarding Yorktown's location and strength. Upon completion of the interrogation, Commander Kosaku Ariga, commanding officer of Arashi, ordered Osmus' execution. He was thrown overboard, but in desperation to save his own life he held on to the railings and refused to let go. One of the Japanese sailors took a fire-axe and killed him with a blow to the back of his head. Osmus was not the only victim of Japanese atrocities during the Battle of Midway. Ensign Frank O'Flaherty and his radioman Bruno Gaido also survived the crashing of their aircraft (SBD Dauntless dive bomber) to be picked up by the Japanese. For six days they were interrogated, though treated reasonably well by Ensign Koju Kanechiku, an officer at the brig of destroyer Makigumo, but they were ultimately thrown overboard with five gallon kerosene cans filed with sea water attached to their bodies.

At 1057 on 4 Jun 1942, Lieutenant Michio Kobayashi and his 18-dive bomber unit took off from Hiryu to attack American carrier Yorktown, escorted by 6 fighters. Two-thirds of his attack force carried 250-kilogram semi armor-piercing bombs against Yorktown while the others carried high explosive bombs against the ship's crew. The force found Yorktown and commenced to attack. US Navy Lieutenant John D. Lorenz, the Battery Officer at Mount 3 just abaft of Yorktown's island, recalled when the first bomb hit near his battle station.

Two more hits hit Yorktown subsequently. The second bomb pierced the flight deck near the island, detonating inside the ship and starting a large fire and many smaller ones. The third bomb hit her on the number one elevator and detonated above the fourth deck, starting a fire in the rag stowage space near the forward gasoline stowage and the magazines, but proper flooding of the magazine and filling the gasoline tanks with carbon dioxide prevented the damage from getting far worse. Although Kobayashi's attack was able to disable Yorktown, a high cost was paid. Out of the 24 aircraft sent on the attack, 18 of them were lost, and of the 6 that returned only 2 were in undamaged condition. Kobayashi was among those killed, shot down by Enterprise VF-6 pilots Thomas Clinton Provost and James Alex Halford who arrived too late to save Yorktown from becoming disabled but in time to intercept the attackers.

With Yorktown damaged, Fletcher transferred his command to cruiser Astoria, thus transferring the command of the American carriers to Spruance. This move was later criticized by Admiral Ernest King, implying that he was too conservative. His decision to depart from the wounded Yorktown was a wise one given the carrier's status, but he also could have transferred to another carrier via Astoria or Astoria's aircraft and continued to lead the American forces. By transferring command and not making sure that Spruance knew immediately of the transfer of command, Fletcher introduced a brief period of dangerous leaderless uncertainty.

At 1300, while the three Japanese carriers burned, the Japanese interrogated another downed American pilot Ensign Wesley Osmus, and finally learned that they were up against not one but three American carriers operating in two separate task forces. Hearts sank momentarily, but the Japanese leadership quickly regrouped to calculate the next steps of battle, which was not easy. Within a few hours of battle they had lost three precious carriers. The Americans paid dearly for the morning's victory, however, losing 70 aircraft (12 fighters, 21 dive bombers, and 37 torpedo bombers), some 40% of all aircraft launched that day. Nagumo, an old school gunnery officer, planned for a final attack by the aircraft of Hiryu, while the surface ships steamed toward the American task forces for a night surface attack. Admiral Kondo's ships also sailed northward at full speed in hope that the two forces would be able to join force during the surface battle. At 1330, Hiryu launched a wave of aircraft led by Tomonaga. As a brief chapter of revenge, this attack crippled the American carrier Yorktown. Tomonaga was shot down during one of the first attack runs on Yorktown, though he was not expected to return in any case: he had valiantly and determinedly chosen to fly a damaged torpedo bomber that could not carry enough fuel for a return trip. Hiryu would later be found, attacked, and disabled. Sustaining critical damage, she was scuttled by her accompanying destroyer Makigumo. The Japanese loss mounted to the devastating result of all four heavy carriers of the Mobile Force sunk.

Rear Admiral Spruance knew that he had dealt heavy damage to Japanese carriers, but could not be sure whether there were any others held in reserve. He wisely set his task force east to sail away from the enemy to avoid a night encounter, something that Nagumo and Kondo were indeed planning for. At 2255, with the Mobile Force essentially non-existent, Yamamoto sent the order to relieve the command of Nagumo; instead, Kondo was to be the overall commander in charge of the night attack that would never come to fruition. Spruance, out of Japanese range in the east, gave the order to turn back westward about midnight at a leisure pace of 15 knots, then took several hours off to get some sleep. By now Japan's ability to initiate battle had been long lost.

Spruance had been criticized since Midway for not being aggressive enough, but right from the start he had been put in a difficult position. "I am one of those commanders who have two sets of orders", he said.

Fifty nautical miles off Midway, Takeo Kurita received word that the invasion had been called off, and unwillingly ordered his task force centered around his four Mogami-class cruisers to turn northwest to rendezvous with Yamamoto's main fleet. At 0238, American submarine Tambor found this force, throwing the Japanese task force into a frenzied emergency maneuvers. In the confusion, Mikuma sailed into the path of Mogami, resulting in a collision that crushed Mogami's bow. With Mikuma and Mogami now traveling at a slower speed, attack waves from Enterprise and Hornet finished off Mikuma. Mogami was able to limp home after receiving some battle damage.

The only favorable event at the stage of the battle was delivered by the submarine I-168. With an extremely daring maneuver, Lieutenant Commander Yahachi Tanabe infiltrated his submarine deep within a ring of escorting destroyers which all failed to detect despite usage of sonar. At 1331 I-168 fired four Type 89 torpedoes at the crippled Yorktown; two struck home while another struck the destroyer Hammann. Hammann sank after her depth charges were ignited. Yorktown sank at 0701 on 7 Jun, marking the end of the most successful submarine attack in the entire war. I-168 barely survived the onslaught of depth charges launched immediately after her torpedoes struck and limped home to Kure.

Author Peter C. Smith noted that "[b]y [Tanabe's] dogged perseverance and audacious and skilled attack, Commander Tanabe had achieved more than the entire kido Butai and main battle fleet combined had done". Indeed, although the Japanese Navy aircraft were the ones that disabled Yorktown, it was Tanabe and the crew of I-168 that actually achieved the only major scores of the battle for the Japanese.

Recall the simultaneous Operation AL against the Aleutian Islands. The pre-invasion air strike on Dutch Harbor started on 3 Jun 1942. Bad weather caused all of carrier Junyo's aircraft to turn back, and only 12 of Ryujo's aircraft could locate their targets, and they found Dutch Harbor anti-aircraft defense much stronger than expected. As a result, the invasion operation was delayed until a renew air strike could be mounted the next day. During the second air strike, the Japanese pilots were able to destroy the base's oil tanks and the hospital. A counterattack launched from Dutch Harbor located the Japanese fleet but failed to deal any damage before bad weather caused the Americans to lose contact with the enemy. The attack on Dutch Harbor pinned down local American air units and other forces that could had been used to reinforce Kiska and Attu. The landings at Kiska took place on 6 Jun 1942 by 550 men of the No. 5 Special Naval Landing Force under Lieutenant Commander Hifumi Mukai plus 700 construction troops, achieving surprise. The initial landing took place near the Salmon Lagoon then moved toward Kiska Harbor over land with naval gunfire support. The ten Americans of the US Navy Weather Detachment at the Kiska weather station were rounded up within a few days, except for one man who held up for 50 days before finally giving himself up. The island of Attu was taken on 7 Jun by 1,200 men of the 301st Independent Battalion of the Japanese Northern Army under Major Matsutoshi Hozumi. Before the Japanese invasion, many native inhabitants were already evacuated to Alaska; the 42 who remained was taken to a prison camp in Otaru, Hokkaido, Japan, where 16 of them later died. Adak, originally the third objective to be taken, was spared as a result of the operational delay. As such, Japan had taken two American pieces of territory shrouded in nearly constant mist and bitter cold. There were some Japanese officers who opposed the occupation of these newly conquered islands in the Aleutian Islands because the Midway operation had resulted in failure, but they were overruled.

Now only with very light Japanese air cover provided by the ancient carrier Zuiho, American air power dominated the area. For example, the destroyer Tanikaze sent to rescue survivors of Hiryu was found by American aircraft sent to search for the same burning carrier. Failing to find Hiryu (because she had already sank), the American aircraft were able to attack Tanikaze almost at leisure. Finally, despite the presence of nearly the entire Japanese navy battle line, Yamamoto decided to cut his losses and headed home.

When the news of the heavy losses at Midway reached Tokyo, Emperor Showa (Hirohito) was deeply shaken. However, the Japanese emperor acted as part of the propaganda machine, proclaiming that the operation was a success in destroying two American carriers at a loss of only one carrier and several ships heavily damaged. The wounded sailor and officers brought back from the battle were quarantined into hospital ships and naval hospitals so to maintain secrecy; when recovered, many of these men were sent directly to South Pacific as replacements without granting them the opportunity to visit their families. Within the Navy, a direct result of the battle was the change in carrier construction and doctrine. Future carrier designs now included better damage control equipment and stronger flight deck armor; the consideration for refueling operations on the flight deck was introduced, as well as a complete rethinking of search and reconnaissance operations (given that Chikuma's scout planes' failure to detect American carrier groups was among key reasons for the defeat). For political reasons, Yamamoto and Nagumo were not sacked of their positions. Both continued to remain in most prominent positions in the Navy. The changes were honest and theoretically viable, but after Midway Japan had lost the initiative, thus making the changes too little too late in terms of effectiveness. Some historians argue that the manpower lost during this war surmounts to a decisive loss for Japan, although in truth the Japanese Navy lost 110 pilots during Midway out of the 2,000 pilots at her disposal at the start of the war; the loss was significant, but hardly decisive. What were painfully lost, however, were the skill sets the losses took away from Japan. The knowledge of aerial combat of the pilots, the efficiency of the armorers, and the experience of the aircraft mechanics were all something that would be nearly impossible to replace.

Photographs

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Visitor Submitted Comments

1. Anonymous says:
   8 May 2005 05:04:49 PM
   
   i thnk that you should put more dates that go along with what is happening
2. PETER KARETKA says:
   2 Sep 2005 07:29:54 PM
   
   I OFFER MY PERSONAL WEB SITE FOR VIEWING,www.karetkamidway.com
   combatant and survivor.ANY QUESTIONS WILL RESPOND TKS
3. Mando says:
   15 Sep 2005 08:21:36 PM
   
   Can you tell me an interpretation of the significant events of the battle of Midway as they relate to current Marine Corps doctrine?
4. Petrsubarbygere says:
   30 Sep 2005 07:28:13 AM
   
   The participation of the movie director John Ford is missing. He filmed the battle. The film (The Battle of Midway) can be download from the Internet Archive (public domain).
5. mya win says:
   24 Nov 2005 04:13:59 AM
   
   study
   
6. Anonymous says:
   19 May 2006 07:30:35 AM
   
   During the battle, in what ship did Admiral Spruance sail?
7. C. Peter Chen says:
   19 May 2006 12:01:56 PM
   
   During this battle, Rear Admiral Spruance was the commander of Task Force 16 which centered around two carriers, USS Enterprise (Capt George Murray) and USS Hornet (Capt Marc Mitscher). Spruance sailed aboard the Enterprise.
8. Nate says:
   30 Jun 2006 08:10:59 AM
   
   This website does explain the main details of the battle and I appreciate it.
9. Anonymous says:
   14 Sep 2006 05:39:27 PM
   
   what order was given by an admiral only once in naval history, it was given shortly after war was declared on japan
10. clarence says:
    20 Dec 2006 05:49:22 AM
    
    CAP operations would not hamper a launching of an immediate *as is* strike as per the advice of Rear Admiral Yamaguchi. Emergency landing CAP aircraft would be rerouted to only 1 of the 4 carriers, allowing the other 3 to launch without impediment. After the 3 completed launching the CAP would be rerouted and the fourth carrier would complete its launch.
11. Anonymous says:
    7 Feb 2007 05:41:59 PM
    
    Excuse my bad english.
    I was interested to know about Cap.Simards actions at midway
    
    My name is Bruno Simard
    I live in Québec
12. Laneal says:
    20 May 2007 03:20:00 PM
    
    My Dad is died in 1983. I heard he was in the Aleution Islands. He would never talk about the war, so I dont really know what he did and where. His name was Avon T Adams. I think he was also in Germany as was my Uncle Howard Adams. They were both in the army and met in Germany. I just watch Band of Brothers which as made even more interested. Does that could tell me more about it. any one know of him
13. Anonymous says:
    28 May 2007 11:52:40 PM
    
    Band of Brothers is awesome, Laneal. Ive seen it, its one of the things that got me interested in the war as well.
14. ark says:
    1 Mar 2008 03:26:36 AM
    
    I am looking for statistics on american
    aircraft on Hawaii islands during the battle of Midway. Seemingly, nobody knows a thing, and some researchers's guesses leaves me in confusion - according to some americans had ab. 360 planes on Oahu -some 200 fighters, 100 (!!) horizontal recon planes and some 60
    hydroplanes (PBY, etc.) - and none of SBD, TDB, not even a single B-17.
    
    Does anybody have any information?
    
15. Anonymous says:
    20 May 2008 11:55:24 AM
    
    i think this website is the boom!!!!
    it help me on my report
    
16. Faulknor says:
    8 Jun 2008 10:16:08 AM
    
    Does this help? www.dive-bombers.co.uk./MidwayVictory.htm
17. Anonymous says:
    17 Feb 2009 01:53:11 PM
    
    Vice Adm. Nagumo lost four carriers at midway, the cream of trained pilots and crews,loss of aircraft and equipment. after the first strike against midway, why didn't he split his carries two would hold with land bombs, the other two load with torpedo's. his zero fighter's low on fuel, no c.a.p. and no radar! For the U.S. Navy it was just luck! while the fighter's were shooting at the low flying torpedo bomber's the hell diver's came in for the kill, the zero's could not reach altitude fast enough. midway doomed japan.
18. rad dude says:
    7 Apr 2009 09:47:27 AM
    
    this was a pretty cool battle. but it was just luck.
19. happy pappy says:
    8 Apr 2009 08:54:54 AM
    
    the battle was completely important it was the greatest turning point during WW2. but i think that the battle was very confusing.
20. tea for two says:
    21 Apr 2009 08:13:25 AM
    
    these pepole don't know what their talking about. It was amazing srategic planning on the american side.
21. Tuy says:
    21 Apr 2009 04:14:36 PM
    
    i really wish more dates would have been put in here.
22. Zauberer says:
    12 Jun 2009 07:57:00 AM
    
    tea for two, americans certainly used the code breaking information against the **** forces, so they could use 3 carriers against the 4 japanese carriers, but Nimitz knew that they needed to be the first ones to spot the japanese task force, so the rendez-vous point for the americans before the battle started was called "Point Luck" that said all about what they needed.
23. Preston Forster says:
    17 Feb 2010 03:23:52 PM
    
    Could anyone please help me find out the colour scheme to the pby-5 catalinas during the battle of midway, Lt Howard Ady's crew names. I would love to know as Iam a model maker and I have been trying to finish a catalina dedicated to Lt Ady.
24. Anonymous says:
    11 May 2010 08:17:44 AM
    
    sweet

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