World War II Database

Contributor: C. Peter Chen
Additional Contributions By: David Stubblebine

ww2dbaseIsoroku Yamamoto was born Isoroku Takano, but changed his name after being adopted by the Yamamoto family. His father was a former low-class samurai warrior. He entered the Japanese Naval Academy and graduated in 1904, and participated in the Russo-Japanese War. He was seriously injured during the Battle of Tsushima in 1905; he recovered though left with many scars. Yamamoto was nicknamed "80 sen" by some of his favorite geisha girls because he lost two fingers from the said battle (at the time, a geisha manicure cost 100 sen, or 1 yen). He was American educated (Harvard University, 1919-1921);, and became a junior naval attaché to several nations. In 1924, at age 40, he changed his specialty from gunnery to aviation, recognizing the upcoming trend in naval warfare.

ww2dbaseDuring the period between 1926 and 1928, Yamamoto was the senior naval attaché to Washington DC, United States at the rank of captain. After 1928 he returned to Japan, becoming an advocate of air power, and was partly responsible for the establishment of Japanese naval air fleet. He said his farewell to his commissioned carrier, the Akagi, briefly, as a delegate to the London naval disarmament conference of 1930. At the conference he had risen to become a popular figure among the Japanese military elite. He returned to Japan and served as the head of the technical division of the Navy's Aeronautics Department, and then commander of the First Carrier Division, taking the Akagi as his command ship once again. At the rank of vice admiral, Yamamoto took on the entire Aeronautics Department before becoming the Deputy Navy Minister in 1936. Due to his peaceful nature, his life was seriously threatened by warlike extremists, who at that time influenced Japanese politics greatly during this period of military and territorial expansion. Under the advice of his colleagues, he was transferred to the Combined Fleet as its Commander-in-Chief, escaping feared retribution, or even assassination, against his political views; assassinations could be called commonplace in this period in Japan. Yamamoto was promoted to the rank of full admiral in 1940 at the venerable age of 56. Despite his age, he continue to exercise regularly and keeping in excellent physical shape.

ww2dbaseAway from his profession, Yamamoto was an avid gamer and gambler, enjoying Shogi (also known as Japanese chess), billiards, bridge, mah jong, poker, among other games that tested his wits and sharpened his mind. He also enjoyed calligraphy and poetry (some would criticize his poems as being monotonous). He was also known to frequent geisha houses, reflecting the fact that he was never very close with his wife, Reizo. He did, however, father four children with his wife, two sons and two daughters. Reizo revealed to the Japanese public in 1954 that Yamamoto was closer to his favorite geisha Kawai Chiyoko than to her, which stirred some controversy.

ww2dbaseIn 1940, Admiral Yamamoto was pressured by the government, by now completely in control by the military, to devise an attack on the United States. Although at first the Imperial General Headquarters, dominated by Army generals, favored a westward or northward land-based expansion against the Soviet Union, setbacks suffered in northeastern China and Mongolia and the ever-draining war against China changed the priorities. At this point, especially with the United States and United Kingdom cutting off critical raw materials from Japan, the island nation's need for raw materials led to her eyeing the resource rich South Pacific. With the Netherlands conquered and the United Kingdom busy defending against an expanding Germany, a Japanese expansion into the South Pacific seemed to be without great obstacles. Yamamoto deduced that a Japanese invasion into Britain-held territory would bring the United States into war, therefore before taking British and Dutch territories, the United States must be neutralized. During a private conversation with Prime Minister Prince Konoe, he said that:

ww2dbaseThis wish of his would not come true; his pessimistic attitude and the inability to use his stature as the former Navy Minister and the current Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to recruit political allies to his cause. This failure ensured the rude awakening of of the power on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. The previously peaceful Treaty Faction officer who resisted a wide-scale war against multiple western nations accepted his duties from above his chain of command. He not only planned for the war that Imperial General Headquarters wanted against the United States, but he also worked to persuade others for a war against the United States in the name of duty. Going against his own belief that the US was too much to take on for Japan, Yamamoto devised an attack against key military installations in the Pacific Ocean. At the last moment, he added Pearl Harbor in the US Territory of Hawaii to the list of targets. As the attacks commenced, the US was brought into WW2.

ww2dbaseIt was after the initial victories of the Pacific War that really drew out Yamamoto's manipulative style of leadership. In order to ensure that the Combined Fleet targeted objectives that he deemed important, he slowly maneuvered himself to a position where fellow admirals Osami Nagano and Shigeru Fukudome slowly ceded their authority to Yamamoto. Unable to accept criticism, Yamamoto ran the Combined Fleet with intimidation.

ww2dbaseMere months after the impossibly successful victories, Yamamoto drew up the plan to attack Midway, an atoll northwest of Pearl Harbor, in order to destroy the aircraft carriers that escaped the Pearl Harbor attack. However, poor planning and less than perfect carrier doctrine ultimately led to the demise of four precious fleet carriers, including his former command ship, Akagi. Naval historian Jonathan Parshall said that "[Yamamoto's] needlessly complex operational scheme at the Battle of Midway dispersed his forces in the face of a still-dangerous foe, and directly led to the disaster there." The fact that Yamamoto accepted to take on a campaign in the Aleutian Islands at the same time as the Midway invasion reflected his failure, arrogantly underestimate the capability of the American fleet and reducing the overall effectiveness of his stab at Central Pacific. The two light carriers and 16 submarines sent to the Aleutian Islands could have changed the outcome of the Midway battle.

ww2dbaseDuring the Solomon Islands campaign, Yamamoto was unable or unwilling to leverage Japanese navy's collection of big guns against the American carrier force (when he did, it was too late) and air force at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. Despite of his contributions to the introduction airpower into the Japanese Navy, his endless pursuit of a Mahanian decisive battle with his big guns ultimately became his greatest shortcoming. Many military historians also criticized his strategies at the Solomon Islands, which "frittered away Japanese maritime strength instead of concentrating it", just like what he had done at the Battle of Midway. In addition, Yamamoto must also at least take partial blame for not preparing Japan to manufacture enough aircraft and train enough pilots to replace casualties. Japan's inability to keep the carriers occupied was a mistake that would prove to have had severe consequences later in the war. "A few more mistakes of this order," Dan van der Vat said in his book The Pacific Campaign, "Yamamoto might have come to be seen, even by the Americans, as an asset to their cause".

ww2dbaseOn 14 Apr 1943, US Navy Fleet Radio Unit Pacific Fleet decoded an intercepted Japanese Navy message, which allowed the US to learn that Yamamoto was planning on an inspection of three front-line bases on or near Bougainville Island in the Solomon Islands. The message contained specific details regarding Yamamoto's arrival and departure times and locations, the type of aircraft that will transport him, and the number of escorting fighters. When Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the US Navy Pacific Fleet, learned of this message, he wanted to go ahead with striking down Yamamoto en route. If successful, his death in battle would also deal a severe blow against Japanese morale, Nimitz concluded. The final go-ahead most likely came from US President Franklin Roosevelt, via Navy Secretary Frank Knox as the messenger. After receiving the approval, Nimitz gave the task to Admiral William Halsey, whose forces were in the Solomon Islands area at the time.

ww2dbaseIn the morning of 18 Apr, green khaki-clad Yamamoto departed Rabaul, New Britain at 0600 hours. In his hands was a sword given by his now deceased brother. He sat in the left-front seat in the passenger compartment of a G4M1 bomber, next to Chief Petty Officer Kotani. His chief of staff, Matome Ugaki, also traveled in the air convoy, but in a different G4M1 aircraft. Six A6M Zero fighters escorted the G4M aircraft. Meanwhile, 18 US Army P-38 Lighting fighters launched from Kukum Field of the Henderson Field complex on Guadalcanal, fitted with extra large drop tanks to provide enough fuel for the long flight. Two fighters aborted during takeoff. The 16 remaining American fighters found Yamamoto's convoy and discovered two G4M1 bombers. Not knowing which one carried the target, both bombers were strafed repeatedly. One of the many .50 caliber rounds that the American pilots fired on the bombers struck Yamamoto. Most likely, the bullet entered Yamamoto's back near his left shoulder while he was tucked in his seat. The bullet exited his left chest, entered his left jaw, and exited again above his right eye near the temple. It most likely killed him instantly. The credit for killing Yamamoto was given to Lieutenant Rex Barber, but Captain Thomas Lanphier, Jr. would contest it for some time to come; many historians would later disagree with Lanphier's claim. Shortly after, the G4M1 aircraft carrying Yamamoto crashed into the jungle, followed by the G4M1 aircraft that carried Ugaki, who would survive the attack. Yamamoto's body was found by Japanese search and rescue party led by Army engineer Lieutenant Hamasuna the next day in the jungle west of Buin. Hamasuna described that he found Yamamoto thrown clear of the wreckage, sitting perfectly straight under a tree, white-gloved hand grasping the hilt of his sword; it was generally thought that Yamamoto's remains were tidied up by Hamasuna and his search party into the condition that Hamasuna had described, out of respect of the admiral.

ww2dbaseThe Japanese government did not announce Yamamoto's death until 21 May 1943. To cover up the fact that the Allies were reading Japanese code, American newspapers published a story that civilian coast watchers in the Solomon Islands saw Yamamoto boarding a bomber in the area. The Japanese Navy bought the story and would fail to change its communications code.

ww2dbaseCaptain Watanabe and his staff cremated Yamamoto's remains at Buin, and the ashes were returned to Tokyo, Japan aboard the battleship Musashi, Yamamoto's last flagship. Yamamoto was given a full state funeral on 5 Jun, where he posthumously received the rank of Marshal Admiral and was awarded the Order of the Chrysanthemum, First Class. Part of his ashes was buried in the public cemetery in Tuma in Tokyo and the remainder at his ancestral burial grounds at the Chuko-Ji Temple in Nagaoka City.

Famous Quote(s)

• "The fate of the Empire rests on this enterprise every man must devote himself totally to the task in hand."
      » On the attacks across the Pacific, 7 Dec 1941

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46.  Bill says:
16 Feb 2009 11:40:10 AM

yamamoto understood carrier airpower, he qualified as a pilot in his 50's he also understood that if japan went to war with the u. s. he would have to win the war fast! he understood the industrail might of the u.s. japan gambled and lost. lesson learned: it took the u.s.a. 44 months to defeat little japan.

56.  Alan Chanter says:
25 Aug 2009 02:49:10 AM

Much of the JNAF’s early superiority over allied pilots can be put down to the tough pilot training instigated by Admiral Yamamoto. Whilst there were many fatal accidents in training, particularly in deck landings, the experience gained would pay dividends when it came to combat. It is said that Yamamoto once told his trainee pilots that to die in training was just as honourable as being killed in combat, but secretly kept a little black book in his tunic pocket which listed the names of all those aircrew that had been killed in training.

98.  C. Peter Chen says:
30 Jan 2017 05:37:47 AM

Dude Ray: That quote is generally regarded as fabricated. Please see:

http://www.factcheck.org/2009/05/misquoting-yamamoto/

100.  C. Peter Chen says:
9 Mar 2017 09:52:59 AM

To anonymous of 9 Mar 2017, the misspelling has been corrected, thank you.