World War II Database

Tamon Yamaguchi was born in the Shimane prefecture in Japan in 1892, and graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1912. In 1918, as a navigation officer, he was exposed to naval aviation while escorting German submarines en route to be delivered as repatriation payments. Between 1921 and 1923 he studied American History at Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, United States, though did not pursue a formal degree; instead, he returned to Japan and completed his studies at the Naval Staff College in 1924. However, he was described as enthusiastic about the American university. After participating in the London Naval Conference in 1929, the diplomatic Captain Yamaguchi was Japan's last naval attaché to Washington D.C., which lasted from 1934 to 1937. He returned to Japan for sea-bound service once again, filling the role of Chief of Staff to the Japanese 5th Fleet from 1938 to 1940. In 1940, he was promoted rear admiral and assigned the 2nd Carrier Division which consisted of the Hiryu and the Soryu. By this time, he was often understood as the successor to Isoroku Yamamoto for the position of the commander of the Combined Fleet.

Commonly credited as being perhaps Japan's most gifted carrier admiral, Yamaguchi was astute, aggressive, and ambitious. Unfortunately for Japan's war effort, he was also heavily steeped in the Bushido Code, which meant that he was pretty much obligated to do away with himself after having lost his carrier Hiryu during the closing stages of the Battle of Midway. "He was, in short, the epitome of the traditional samurai - hot tempered, aggressive to a fault; a man who valued honor as the ultimate virtue", as described in the book Shattered Sword; or as Japanese navy officer Masatake Chihaya said, the "Oriental Hero Type". When he determined that Hiryu was unsaveable, he gathered the 800 men who were still aboard the ship, including the wounded, on the flight deck near the bridge, and led them in yelling banzai three times toward Tokyo, followed by the playing of the national anthem. After the ceremony, the order to abandon ship was issued. It was recorded that Yamaguchi and Tomeo Kaku (Hiryu's captain) had this exchange as they shared naval biscuits and water while the ship being abandoned, the exchange signifying how much the two officers had in common.

The foundation of the decision to go down with the ship probably was established when his top pilot Joichi Tomonaga bravely headed off to attack the carrier Yorktown in a damaged torpedo plane that carried too little fuel for a return trip. "I will gladly follow you", Yamaguchi said to Tomonaga before the pilot boarded the plane. He probably could have saved himself to fight another day, but that was not the Bushido way. His idealistic devotion to Bushido was likely one of the key reasons why Japan, after three fleet carrier on the verge of sinking (and eventually would sink), was unable to steer Hiryu from the same fate. Yamaguchi placed Hiryu in increasingly more dangerous positions by sailing toward the enemy, therefore eventually sacrificing assets for his personal honor instead of preserving the strength for his country in a later fight.

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Visitor Submitted Comments

1. Martim says:
   3 Oct 2005 10:17:24 AM
   
   Why cant I find the USS Rixie. It was an attach hospital ship in WW 2. I know it has been dismantled but there should be some reacor of it.
2. Tom Black says:
   7 Jun 2006 08:08:46 AM
   
   While the strict code of Bushido doubtless encouraged self-sacrifice, it seems unlikely that Yamaguchi really had any opportunity to save Hiryu.
   
   Perhaps the only chance would have been to turn tail and flee the moment the other three Japanese carriers had been disabled by the US dive-bombers. But such an action would surely have been unthinkable to any commander, Japanese or other.
   
   The US had just struck a devastating blow. Hiryu was the only fighting force left able to strike back. It had the power to sink a US carrier: and it did so. Not to have used that power would have been disgraceful to any leader, not just a Bushido warrior.
   
   Suppose Yamaguchi had wanted to to sail away instead: this was presumably against orders, and would hardly have saved the ship. He could not have got out of range. The US planes would have searched and probably found Hiryu and sunk her anyway.
   
   By taking the action he did, Yamaguchi brought Japan the only real gain achieved from the whole mission: the destruction of the Yorktown. But that was not his only contribution.
   
   It is said that when the first sighting of US ships was reported, Yamaguchi urgently proposed to Nagumo that all available planes should be re-armed with anti-ship weapons and then launched on the quickest possible strike against the American fleet. Nagumo however decided against this, as no carriers had been reported. He continued with the plan of preparing a second land strike against Midway, so that when a carrier was eventually reported, and the change of plan was finally forced upon him, Nagumo had to accept a far longer delay than if he had followed Yamaguchis advice.
   
   This delay was fatal: because it meant the Japanese carriers had to receive the US dive-bomb attack when in the most vulnerable possible condition, their decks crowded with planes loaded up with fuel and explosives, not to mention the unstowed ground-attack ordnance still on deck: the absolute worst-case scenario.
   
   If Yamaguchis advice had been taken, the US attacks would still have come in, and would still have been able to do damage: but hardly so great as in the actual fact, seeing that the condition of the Japanese carriers would have been that much less vulnerable with their bombers away. At the same time, the Japanese strike would have been able to hit the Americans. Seeing that a one-carrier strike from Hiryu was able to doom the Yorktown, what would have happened if a four-carrier Japanese strike had gone in? It seems reasonable to believe that all three US carriers would have been destroyed or at least badly damaged.
   
   Who was right, Nagumo or Yamaguchi? Hindsight says Yamaguchi was clearly right. But consider the question without hindsight. Should Nagumo have decided immediately to change plan and go for the anti-ship strike, even though no carriers had been reported? Japanese intelligence led him to believe no US carriers were near. The Japanese submarine screen had seen no US ships leaving harbour. Earlier air search had found nothing. Now some ships were reported, but no carriers. Did this one report really change the whole picture?
   
   The answer is yes, but to accept this meant abandoning the mindset in which the commander had viewed the whole operation up to now. This Nagumo proved unable to do. It meant suddenly thinking the unthinkable: that the Americans had outwitted the Japanese and were about to turn the tables by surprising the surpriser. It was US intelligence work which had enabled this, by revealing the Japanese plan and putting the Americans one step ahead, instead of one behind.
   
   What Yamaguchi saw was the significance of any US ships being found: why would the US have put any ships into the operational area, moving before the Japanese submarine screen was in place, if they were unaware of the Japanese plan? Of course, it might be an exercise, or some routine manoeuvre, but no commander in war can afford to dismiss a sighting in this way, when his ships are so vulnerable.
   
   Yamaguchi saw that the sighting of US ships meant, or at least could mean, that the Japanese approach was known in advance and was already being acted against. This meant it was necessary to react fully. And the critical time situation meant it was necessary to react immediately. That was Yamaguchis true insight and sound judgement. His recommendation of this course to the commander shows that he did his duty in full. Yamaguchi proved himself equal to the occasion, while Nagumo proved himself unequal to it.
   
   Suppose Yamaguchi had been commander in place of Nagumo: what would the outcome have been? Seeing that the US dive-bombers came in just as the Japanese strike was about to launch, it is clear that Yamaguchis decision to change plan earlier means that the Japanese strike would have been airborne some time before the US attack went in. Given that the Japanese ships were both less vulnerable with their bombers away and better able to deploy fighters in defence, it seems unlikely they would have lost all four carriers. The superiority of the Zero fighter at this stage of the war may well have meant the destruction of many of the US bombers, as it had done for each earlier US attack in the battle.
   
   The Americans on the other hand had only three carriers to bear the brunt of a four-carrier strike. The bombs that in actual fact exploded inside the Japanese planes, while still on their own flight-decks, which made the US strike so devastating, would instead have been exploding in and around the US ships. It is difficult to believe the Japanese planes would have failed to sink at least two US carriers.
   
   Given the vulnerability of Yorktown, still not properly repaired after the Coral Sea, the chances are the US would have had all three carriers either sunk or out of action for a long time. Whereas the Japanese that evening may well have had two or more carriers still in fighting condition.
   
   In this situation, the Japanese battle fleet with its heavy ships unopposed by anything on the US side, could have come up to Midway under carrier screen and carried out bombardment preparatory to the planned invasion. That invasion might then have gone in successfully. All this turned on the failure of Nagumo to follow the sure military instinct of Tamon Yamaguchi.
   
3. clarence says:
   20 Dec 2006 05:33:10 AM
   
   The way I’ve read the encounter, Yamaguchi insisted that all reserve aircraft be immediately launched *as is* to loft a strike before the Midway aircraft would return. About 12 of an immediate strike would have been armed with general purpose bombs rather than the proper armor piercing bombs or torpedoes.
   
   Even so a 100+ aircraft strike against wooden deck aircraft carriers would have been devastating. The gassed & armed aircraft wouldn’t have been sitting around to burst into flames & explode inside their own hangars, they’d have been off putting ordnance on target placing the 2 USN task forces on the defensive.
   
4. clarence says:
   20 Dec 2006 05:37:30 AM
   
   In my comment of 20 December the backslash between the 1 and the 2 did not appear. The sentence ought to read, About half of an immediate strike.
5. Anonymous says:
   16 Feb 2008 08:18:34 PM
   
   I have some information on the usss Rixie. I had a Brother that served aboard her. may be reched at bootstruck74@yahoo.com
6. Peter C Smith says:
   20 Jun 2008 01:37:39 PM
   
   I am inclined to agree with the arguments put forward here by Mr Tom Black and clarence. In fact, in my book Midway Dauntless Victory, I have already included just such a suggestion to my readers for their consideration.
   
   Peter c Smith

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