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Located in eastern New Guinea, Port Moresby was an important objective. Aside from the bay being a good natural port, Port Moresby was also the gate to Australia. If captured, it would become the strategic point on the east flank of the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere that could command air and sea of a wide area. Allied General Douglas MacArthur truly believed that without the New Guinea port, Australia would soon see Japanese landings; thus, he gambled to hold Port Moresby.

Japanese Landings at Buna, Gona, and Sananda
21-29 Jul 1942

Japan's first attempt to take Port Moresby was an amphibious invasion, however, it was averted by the outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. The Japanese now had no choice but to mount an overland invasion against Port Moresby over New Guinea's treacherous Owen Stanley Range. On 21 Jul 1942, Japanese troops landed on the northern coast of the Papuan Peninsula and established beach heads at Buna, Gona, and Sananda. The 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hatsuo Tsukamoto, conducted a combat-ready reconnaissance patrol toward the village of Kokoda. After exchanging hands a couple of times, the small Australian militia unit "Maroubra Force" under the command of Australian Basil Morris at the entrance of the Kokoda Trail was overwhelmed by the Japanese troops, and the entrance was captured on 29 Jul. Morris assumed that the Japanese troops were merely performing a reconnaissance mission in force. Much to his, and all Allied commanders', surprise, the Japanese began to march into the trail over the Owen Stanley mountain range.

Kokoda Track
30 Jul 1942-22 Jan 1943

From the village of Kokoda, Major General Tomitaro Horii led an invasion force of 8,500 men of the battle-hardened 144th Regiment of the South Seas Detachment. In four weeks, the Japanese achieved what was deemed impossible, marching across the deadly jungles, disease-ridden swamps, and the deep gorges. "How many men succumbed in this heroic endeavor will never be known," wondered author William Manchester. In the treacherous environment where even blades of grass could slice skin right open, Manchester noted what he imagined the Japanese had likely gone through on this journey:

The captured diary of a Japanese soldier reflected what Manchester imagined:

They made it across the Kokoda Trail, but it was then the jungle trekkers who were surprised: MacArthur's troops were dug in there well beyond what they expected. Captain Toshikazu Ohmae of the Japanese Navy recalled after the war that "[t]he Japanese did not think General MacArthur would establish himself in New Guinea and defend Australia from that position.... [H]e did not have sufficient forces to maintain himself there", but he, like the Japanese officers, had forgotten MacArthur's unorthodox determination ("a lesser general might have considered the abandonment of Port Moresby", said Manchester) and the conviction of his troops to hold New Guinea for Australia. MacArthur's troops, too, were suffering from the jungle as much as the Japanese. MacArthur himself recalled the humidity, the heat, and the terrible diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, and dysentery that made the experience a hellish one for his soldiers. Insects and parasites, too, plagued them: hookworms, ringworms, mosquitoes, leeches, chiggers, ants, fleas, and others that the soldiers did not even know the names of. An Australian officer later noted:

The Japanese offensive over the Kokoda Trail saw Australian resistance at Isurava, outside of Port Moresby. With a tight timetable, Horii launched a series of brutal frontal attacks against the 400-strong Australian defenders. The defenders held on valiantly for four days, then they retreated towards Port Moresby. At a battle at the location that was later named Brigade Hill, the Japanese offensive's flanking maneuver separated the Australian forces into two groups, forcing troops to retreat through the thick jungle. Australian General Thomas Blamey, frustrated at the defeat and holding inaccurate intelligence noting a smaller Japanese force than what his men faced, replaced the commander Arnold Potts with Selwyn Porter. When he lectured the troops for the "failure" of letting the Japanese advance so close to Port Moresby, the troops jeered at the general right on the parade ground. In time, the Australian green troops' effort that stopped the Japanese offensive would be considered one of the greatest feats in Australian military history.

Although the lights of Port Moresby were now in sight after the victory at Brigade Hill, Horii had no choice but to dig in for that his supplies line across the Kokoda Trail was breaking down. His troops, exhausted from fighting Allied forces and nature alike, were showing signs of advanced starvation. Some reports noted the Japanese had to resort to cannibalism in order to survive. Horii was relieved to receive orders from his superiors that he was to fall back to Buna due to the shift of the overall war situation. He knew it was no easy task to cross the Owen Stanley once again, but the food situation rendered him without choice even if he did not receive the fall-back order. He began to pull back his troops on 24 Sep. On 26 Sep, MacArthur called for a counterattack up the Kokoda Trail, not knowing that the Japanese had already started their retreat. Despite the lack of food, the Japanese army fought ferociously, even after Horii drowned late in Oct 1942 in the Kumusi River. As the Australian troops embarked onto the Kokoda Trail, Japanese corpses were found, death by diseases of the equatorial jungle.

Battle of Milne Bay
25 Aug 1942–5 Sep 1942

Horii's attack on Port Moresby over the Kokoda Trail was timed with a landing at Milne Bay at the eastern tip of New Guinea. On 25 Aug, 2,400 men of the 5th Kure Special Naval Landing Force and the 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force (non-combat) landed at Milne Bay under the command of Commander Shojiro Hayashi. The Japanese enjoyed initial success against Australian troops, having the advantage of light tanks. On 29 Aug, Commander Yano landed with an 800-men reinforcement group and took over tactical command. Seeing no progress, the Japanese retreated on 5 Sep.

Unlike Blamey, British Field Marshal Sir William Slim was much more complimentary toward the Australian soldiers, commenting on the following inspiring words despite his misidentification of enemy units:

Beyond the strategic gains for this victory, Allied forces gained a great boost in morale.

Battle of Buna-Gona
16 Nov 1942-22 Jan 1943

In Jan 1943, after MacArthur's American contingents arrived, a joint American-Australian operation was launched to retake Buna and Gona. The first surprise went in favor of the Japanese; Allied intelligence underestimated the strength of the Japanese force in the area, estimating 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers when there were over 6,500, all well dug in. The battle quickly turned into a series of bitter struggles over each defensive position. Because the Owen Stanley Mountain did not allow vehicular traffic, all Allied supplies had to arrive by air, notably with converted Liberator bombers as transports. The supply situation was not any better for the Japanese, however. Despite control of the sea, Allied air power still took a heavy toll on transport vessels coming into the area. To instill new blood in the command structure, MacArthur brought in Robert Eichelberger, who arrived at the front on 2 Dec 1942. After a two-day break for reorganization, Eichelberger pushed on again on 5 Dec. On the following day, the Japanese finally broke at Gona. Buna fell to the Allies on 14 Dec. The last Japanese hold in the area was Sananda, which fell on 22 Jan 1943 after running out of food. Again, evidences of cannibalism were found among Japanese soldiers. With the region secured, the conclusion of the battle also ended Japanese resistance on and near the Kokoda Trail.

Similar to previous actions on the island, diseases caused far more casualties to both sides than actual combat.

Battle of the Bismarck Sea
2-4 Mar 1943

On 23 Dec 1942, Japanese IGHQ (Imperial General Headquarters) gave the order to transfer 100,000 troops from Japan and China to New Guinea as reinforcements. It was a large exercise in Japanese logistics, but a successful landing of these troops at Lae could possibly turn back the Australian and American offensive, and perhaps even take Port Moresby. On 28 Feb, a convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transports set sail with 6,900 troops from Rabaul under the cover of about 100 aircraft. The convoy sailed undetected until 1500 on 1 Mar when a Liberator bomber spotted it north of Cape Hollman. The group of bombers sent to intercept the convoy did not find their target, but on the next day several flights of Flying Fortress bombers found and sank up to three transports. After a few unsuccessful attempts at attacking the convoy by Catalina and Beaufort aircraft, an attack by 13 Flying Fortresses at 1000 on 3 Mar scattered the convoy, making the ships vulnerable to follow-up attacks by Beaufighters and Mitchell bombers. The action was a near total loss for the Japanese. Only 800 out of the 6.900 soldiers made their way to Lae, at the cost of all eight transports, four of the eight destroyers, twenty aircraft, and over 2,000 lives.

Decision to Abandon New Guinea
30 Sep 1943

On 30 Sep 1943, IGHQ endorsed a plan to reduce Japan's defense perimeter that was drew up 15 days before. This new defense perimeter went from Burma through the East Indies, across western New Guinea and the Carolines and finally to the Marshalls. Although this was a good effort to consolidate conquests and to shorten supply lines, this plan meant the abandonment of 300,000 troops outside of the perimeter, surrounded by Allied air power and could not be evacuated. Eastern New Guinea was one of the places abandoned by this plan, with 120,000 Japanese soldiers running out of food and supplies. First Lieutenant Toshiro Kuroki commanded the Third Company of the 20th Engineer Regiment attached to the 20th Division, stationed in New Guinea at the time. He recalled the rice supplies running thin as days wore on:

With the Japanese troops stranded, Allied troops began their slow movement across this second largest island in the world.

The Battle of Cape Gloucester
15 Dec 1943-22 Apr 1944

On 15 Dec 1943, American 112th Cavalry Regiment landed at Arawe on the island of New Britain to disrupt Japanese supply lines, paving the way for the main invasion force of Major General William H. Rupertus' US 1st Marine Division that arrived on 26 Dec. Opposite of the American landers was Major General Iwao Matsuda's Japanese 17th Division, who resisted the American advance. Although the action on New Britain lasted through the following five months, the Allies had already achieved their goal with the invasion: with American troops present on the island, the use of airfields by the Japanese were limited, therefore further contributing to the primary objective of isolating the island stronghold of Rabaul.

Admiralty Islands
26 Feb-25 Mar 1944

With a similar goal as New Britain, MacArthur wanted the Admiralty Islands to cut off Rabaul. Additionally, gaining the Admiralty Islands would secure the right flank of the Allied advance across the northern coast of New Guinea. Intelligence photos given to MacArthur showed airfields that appear abandoned, confusing his staff the actual number of defenders there; it was the tactic of Colonel Yoshio Ezaki, who wished to remain mysterious and keep his enemies guessing on his strength. All Ezaki's men were hidden in the jungles, ordered not to fire at enemy aircraft. US Army Air Forces thought the island was only held by a small number of Japanese troops, while the Army thought Ezaki's strength was somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000. Ezaki's actual strength was about 4,450.

On 29 Feb, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's ship provided transport for part of Brigadier General William Chase's First Cavalry Division, about 1,000 dismounted men, to Los Negros. Unlike typical amphibious assaults, the landing force was small, largely due to the lack of intelligence on Japanese strength. They were ordered to secure the nearby airfield, and either fall back if the airfield if it was heavily defended or hold the airfield if only moderately defended; in both cases, they would be reinforced later. The landing was conducted with surprise, and the airfield was taken relatively easily by the 2nd Squadron of the 5th Cavalry Regiment. They set up a defensive line near the coast so that any attacking Japanese would need to dash across the open airfield with little cover. Repeated Japanese counterattacks, all in the form of small night attacks during the next few nights, instilled fear with American soldiers, but all of the attacks were fought off. The support force finally arrived on 4 Feb, followed by the arrival of the 12th Cavalry Regiment on 6 Mar and the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on 9 Mar. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade secured the small adjacent islands over the following few days, including the landing on Manus on 15 Mar to occupy the Japanese airfield on that island.

Los Negros Island was cleared of Japanese forces on 25 Mar, but Manus Island was not cleared until May. At the Admiralty Islands, about 4,400 Japanese were killed and 75 prisoners were taken. The Americans, all of whom belonged to the US 1st Cavalry Division (Special), suffered 290 killed and 977 wounded. Despite outnumbering the American forces at the start of the battle, which was extremely rare at this stage of war, Colonel Ezaki was unable to capitalize on the numerical advantage to secure a victory, which would have provided the morale boost that Japan desperately needed. With Admiralty Islands under Allied control, MacArthur commented that "the noose was complete." Rabaul was now choked off with its large garrison of troops idling in frustration.

Aitape and Hollandia
22 Apr 1944-Aug 1944

On 22 Apr 1944, a two-pronged attack was launched to attack Aitape and Hollandia. MacArthur had hopes that they would provide the valuable airfields needed to further his attack across the island, and perhaps even bomber fields that might later be used to attack the Philippines. Both landing forces achieved complete surprise. "No withering fire met us at the beach", said MacArthur. "Instead, there was only disorder-rice still boiling in pots, weapons and personal equipment of every kind abandoned. No more than token resistance was met at any point, and there was no interference from the enemy's air or naval forces. In postwar interrogations, Jo Iimura, a Japanese defender in the region at the time, said "[t]he allied invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was a complete surprise to us. After considering the past operational tactics of the enemy... we believed they would attempt to acquire an important position somewhere east of Aitape.... Because we misjudged... we were neither able to reinforce nor send war supplies to their defending units."

Once on land, however, Eichelberger's troops discovered that Lieutenant General Hatazo Adachi's 18th Army had regrouped. Adachi's men counterattacked in strength multiple times near Aitape, causing serious casualties. "I cannot find any means nor method which will solve this situation strategically or tactically", said Adachi to his troops. "Therefore, I intend to overcome this by relying on our Japanese Bushido." The first of the such massed attacks took place on 11 Jul, attacking in multiple waves despite heavy casualties from Allied machine guns and artillery. For the next two weeks the Japanese attacks persisted, but to little success. Adachi later acknowledged that he felt he lost ten thousand men during the offensive. On 13 Jul, the Allied forces launched a double enveloping counteroffensive that divided Adachi's remaining troops into two groups, soon rendering them useless. All effective resistance ceased on 10 Aug, though small elements harassed Allied troops in the region until the end of the war.

Wakde
17 May 1944-Aug 1944

Even before Aitape and Hollandia were secured, MacArthur had already marked Wakde as his next target, mainly due to the fact that Aitape had proved to be unsuitable for the building of major airfields. Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Sixth Army ("Alamo Force") landed at Wakde on 17 May. They met a similar level of stubborn resistance at Wakde mainly because of Wakde being well established with numerous storage depots. MacArthur claimed to have gained Wakde as an usable base of future operations, but some troops were bogged down in the area until nearly the end of the war.

Biak
27 May 1944-22 Jul 1944

Across Geelvink Bay north of western New Guinea lay the island of Biak and its three airfields, which could prove to be dangerous as Allied troop transports operated closer and closer to the western tip of New Guinea. With its additional strategic value as an excellent jump-off point for the Philippines, MacArthur sent Major General Fuller and his 41st Division on Operation Hurricane to take the island. "The light enemy resistance at the beachhead held little hint of what was to come", recalled MacArthur. Lieutenant Colonel Naoyuki Kuzume put up a fierce defense that included tanks, which was rare for Japanese troops in this theater of the Pacific War. Kuzume utilized his knowledge of the island's topography and devised a brilliant defense plan that fully utilized the terrain. He was further reinforced by the Second Amphibious Brigade of the Southern Army from Mindanao via "Tokyo Express" during Operation Kon. His effective defense even rendered the airfields, newly captured by the Allies, useless. On 28 Jun, Kuzume's command post, located in one of the numerous caves, was breached. He committed ritual suicide. The remaining caves continued to fight ferociously. Frustrated American troops soon discovered the brutal tactic of simply dynamiting the caves, causing the cave roofs to collapse on the defenders hiding inside. The island was finally secured on 22 Jul.

At the conclusion of the Biak actions, Americans killed all but 150 of the 7,200 Japanese defenders (the 150 escaped), while losing 438 of their own. The Americans, similar to other Pacific actions, lost more men from the front lines to diseases than deaths and battle wounds. Biak turned out to be an important battle for another reason. It was the first time Japanese troops effectively used caves as defensive strongholds. Before this point, Japanese troops defended the islands at the beach; when all was lost, surviving troops formed a banzai charge, and the battle was over. After the battle, the Japanese began to include caves as an option, which dramatically increased American casualty rates during operations to secure the subsequent islands.

Noemfoor
2-7 Jul 1944

Allied troops landed on the island of Noemfoor, a small island directly west of Biak, on 2 Jul. After sporadic resistance, the island was declared secure on 7 Jul.

Vogelkop Peninsula and the Conclusion of the Campaign

The last obstacle in liberating all of New Guinea was the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Japanese resistance on the peninsula gathered at Manokwari, and MacArthur did not wish to contest with this force. Instead, his "hit 'em where they ain't" strategy took the Allied forces to a number of undefended beaches near Cape Opmaria and Sansapor. Like Rabaul, the 25,000 men at Manokwari were now stranded, frustratingly idling uselessly.

In Sep 1944, Allied troops occupied the Halmahera Islands, concluding the New Guinea Campaign. MacArthur was now only several hundred miles from the Philippines. In his memoir, MacArthur attributed to the Allied victory over New Guinea to mobility and the ability to achieve surprise at key confrontations. Additionally, he also insisted that his refusal to deploy military governors over conquered regions helped his command focus on the task at hand. Instead, he brought in Dutch and Australian civil administrators immediately after the area had been deemed secure. "The success of this method was reflected in the complete lack of friction between the various governments concerned", he noted.

Photographs

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Visitor Submitted Comments

1. Anonymous says:
   15 Mar 2006 11:30:20 PM
   
   u need pics
2. Anonymous says:
   15 Mar 2006 11:32:41 PM
   
   u need kokada track pics
   
3. Anonymous says:
   22 Apr 2006 06:52:21 PM
   
   WHAT ABOUT SHAGGY RIDGE?
   
4. Anonymous says:
   21 Aug 2006 02:44:39 AM
   
   Thank you for making such a wonderful site. I really like how you try to desribe all battle. It is really wonderful. I have to agree with previous comments about the lack of pictures here. If you want to get some pictures I can put you in contact with someone who lives in Canberra (the capital of Australia), where our war museum is located. He can help you there.
5. Anonymous says:
   23 Jul 2007 05:51:28 PM
   
   wE manned QS ships and were at sawmill jetty on New Guinea, then Admiralties, then Phillipines, and the Army of Occupation in Japan. Would love to get some pictures of the area. Not far from Hollandia.
6. Anonymous says:
   10 Mar 2010 07:49:01 PM
   
   Just discovered your site....it's mine blowing....am history buff and eat this stuff right-up....keep-up good work,the world needs to know what happened
7. Anonymous says:
   10 Apr 2010 04:31:22 PM
   
   This is a great website. The story needs to unfold completely.
   
   My dad was in the US 742nd Military Police Battalion in New Guinea... can't find any history of the unit anyplace. Let me know if you hear anything.
8. Anonymous says:
   18 May 2010 09:55:58 PM
   
   There is a short but colorful story about the fighting near Buna here: http://yankarchives.com/article.php?article_id10
9. dinkie die says:
   4 Aug 2010 11:25:02 AM
   
   An interesting article but is not MacArthurs army which stopped the **** on the Kokoda trail or at Milne Bay. It was the 'diggers' and even the 'choco soldiers of the militia who eventually stopped the **** ...and then they had to rescue the 38th from their disaster et Buna and Gona.
   Full marks to McKarther for learning though: it has been guessed that about 100,000 **** died of disease and starvation on the long inland retreat along New Guinea. "Hit them them where they are not!"
   Of couse, total command of the air is useful.
   A general thinks tactics.
   An army commander thinks strategy.
   A genious thinks logistics.
   Cheers TKerr
10. Anonymous says:
    23 Aug 2010 08:02:10 PM
    
    this is a really great site, i just enjoy getting information off here its beautiful, and inspiring, you amaze me.

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