World War II Database

Battle of Eastern Solomons
23-25 Aug 1942

The first major carrier battle off the Solomon Islands occurred shortly after the American landings on Guadalcanal. Although Guadalcanal was always a secondary objective for the Japanese, they realized regular reinforcements and supply runs were critical for a continuous campaign on that island to recapture Henderson Field. Consequently, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto put together a powerful expeditionary force whose aim was first to destroy any American fleet units that might be in the area, and then eliminate Henderson Field. This force sortied from Truk on 23 Aug. Simultaneously, several other reinforcement, support, and bombardment groups sortied from both Truk and Rabaul.

The Americans had a maximum of three carriers with which to meet the Japanese force, but Wasp was detached to refuel on 23 Aug, so she was out of the coming action. As a result, the Americans only had two carriers, Saratoga and Enterprise, and their 176 aircraft to meet the two Japanese fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Ryujo. The Japanese had 177 aircraft at their disposal. In his usual tendency to devise complex battle plans, Yamamoto sent the light carrier Ryujo ahead of the rest of the fleet on a bait role, sending her planes to attack Guadalcanal, thus drawing attention from the American pilots; meanwhile, the aircraft from the two fleet carriers would charge in to attack the American counterparts. The bait Ryujo was overwhelmed and was hit by several 1,000-lb bombs then subsequently one hit by aerial torpedo. She eventually sank that night after being abandoned. While Ryujo was being attacked, her larger fleet mates Shokaku and Zuikaku counterattacked. Their aircraft passed the curtain of anti-aircraft fire laid down by North Carolina and other ships, and damaged Enterprise badly with three bomb hits. The bombs passed through several decks aft and exploded deep in the carrier and caused serious fires and casualties. However, effective damage control kept her from being disabled. She was able to restore use of the flight deck briefly while Nagumo's aircraft returned for fuel. Enterprise managed to transfer the majority of her aircraft to Henderson Field before limping away to the southeast to fight another day. During this confrontation, Enterprise's aircraft also disabled the Japanese seaplane carrier Chitose, though she would be saved. The Japanese fleet attempted to Admiral Nobutake Kondo looked to engage the Americans in a night surface fight with his battleships and cruisers, but Fletcher withdrew southward to avoid just such an engagement. After failing to find the American fleet, Kondo turned his force back at 2330, ending the battle.

The next day both fleets "groped for each other like tired wrestlers with smoke in their eyes", said Dan van der Vat. The Japanese launched an air raid on Guadalcanal, causing havoc, while American Marine aircraft engaged Tanaka's convoy headed by the flagship Jintsu near Taivu Point. A Japanese transport was sunk, and the older destroyer Mutsuki was so badly hit that she had to be scuttled. Several other warships were damaged; Tanaka's own Jintsu was hit as well. At this point, Tanaka wisely withdrew and rescheduled the supply run for the night of 28 Aug via destroyers. Meanwhile, the American carrier Wasp positioned herself east of Guadalcanal expecting Japanese movement there, but found none.

Strategically, the Japanese had an opportunity for a decisive victory but failed to achieve it, instead allowing the Americans to step away with a perception of victory, even only with a small margin. Additionally, the reinforcement of Henderson Field of Guadalcanal by Enterprise's aircraft became a precedent, making daylight supply runs to Guadalcanal impossible for Japanese shipping. The Japanese only weeks before had total control of the sea in the region; now they were forced to making supply runs only under the cover of darkness.

Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands
25-27 Oct 1942

Since Battle of Eastern Solomons, Yamamoto's standing order for the navy had always been "to apprehend and annihilate any powerful forces in the Solomons area, as well as any reinforcements." He was sure his Combined Fleet could do just that with an arsenal of 4 carriers, 5 battleships, 14 cruisers, and 44 destroyers; the force greatly outnumbered anything William Halsey, who entered the theater on 15 Oct, had under his disposal.

On 23 Oct 1942, 650 miles north of Espiritu Santo, an American aircraft spotted a Japanese carrier and radioed in the warning. A small group of torpedo bombers took off to search for the ship, and only one pilot was able to find the ship; he launched his torpedo but it missed. On 26 Oct, the scouting aircraft of the two opposing carrier groups found each other. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo launched his 65 aircraft first, then Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid launched his aircraft from Enterprise 20 minutes later. Rear Admiral George Murray did not launch his aircraft from carrier Hornet until yet another 30 minutes later. The Americans launched in total 73 aircraft. The Japanese found the American carriers first, but with Enterprise hiding in a squall, Hornet was the only one the Japanese pilots saw, and that was how they reported it back to Kondo. Hornet began to be attacked around 0910 by the entire Japanese force, but Hornet and her anti-aircraft screen laid out a heavy wall of flak. Within minutes of engagement, a bomb hit the starboard side of the flight deck aft, then two near-misses caused minor damage. Next, the Japanese squadron commander crashed his damaged dive bomber into Hornet, glancing off the stack and the two still-attached bombs exploded. Finally, two aerial torpedoes struck Hornet in the engineering spaces, slowing the ship to a stop, becoming an easy target for the three quarter-ton bombs that struck her subsequently. One of these three bombs penetrated four decks before exploding, causing serious fires underneath. Hornet was now completely crippled, but it came at a cost of 25 Japanese aircraft.

Because fuel was not in abundance, American aircraft that were launched first went ahead for the enemy formation without hovering overhead to wait for the later-launched comrades. What resulted was the Enterprise aircraft reaching the Japanese first without a concerted effort of a greater number of different types of bombers. The Enterprise aircraft reached the Shokaku group at 0930 and attacked the Japanese carrier. Japanese combat air patrol Zero fighters attacked the unescorted American SBD dive bombers and shot down or turned back several, but three to six of them still successfully planted their 1,000-lb bombs on the flight decks of Shokaku. The damage Shokaku sustained during this battle was so great that she was to be out of the war for the next nine months. Had the Enterprise dive bombers waited for Hornet's torpedo bombers before launching their strike, a couple of well-placed torpedoes at this time could have finished Shokaku. In fact, Hornet's torpedo bombers failed to find Shokaku completely; instead, they gave up their search for the carrier and launched their torpedo ineffectively at cruiser Suzuya around 0930 and headed home. Another group of aircraft, also from Hornet, failed to find the Japanese carriers, and instead made their dives on cruiser Chikuma, exploding a bomb on the bridge and killing many senior officers.

Kondo was an able commander who very quickly figured out, based on the number of American attackers, that there must be two enemy carriers in the vicinity. While Hornet and her escorting destroyers fought the raging fires on the carrier, Kondo ordered a search and strike on the second carrier. Enterprise was found about 1000. This time it was the Japanese who made the mistake of not attacking in coordination. Dive bombers attacked Enterprise without waiting for the arrival of torpedo bombers. Enterprise and battleship South Dakota fired their anti-aircraft weapons with effectiveness, with the carrier downing 7 aircraft and the battleship 26. Out of the 23 bombs released against Enterprise, only two hits and one near-miss were scored. The first hit exploded 50 feet under the forecastle deck, and the second crashed into the third deck before exploding. Despite damage, Enterprise was not disabled.

During the battle, American destroyer Porter was lost, and destroyer Smith's superstructure was damaged from a suicide attack from a torpedo bomber. A subsequent attack attempted to sink the damaged Hornet, but it was ineffective. Cruiser Northampton attempted to tow her to safety, but it took a while to get going. Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Murray transferred his flag from Hornet to cruiser Pensacola. In the early afternoon, Captain Mason of Hornet ordered all wounded and non-essential men to be removed from the ship. Kondo put together a smaller aerial strike force than the morning attack to spearhead a second assault that included surface ships. At 1515, the Japanese aircraft reached Hornet, launching six torpedoes. Northampton cut the towing cables and successfully maneuvered to save herself, but the immobile Hornet was struck by one of them, rapidly flooding the after engine room. At 1540 Japanese dive bombers appeared, but all their bombs missed. At 1550, a formation of six horizontal bombers appeared and scored a hit on Hornet's flight deck. At 1702, a small strike force from light carrier Junyo scored a final bomb hit on the carrier's hangar deck. After suffering 111 killed and 108 wounded, she was finally to be scuttled. American destroyer Mustin received the order to launch eight torpedoes at Hornet, and to a great embarrassment, only three hit, and they did not effectively sink the carrier. At 1920, destroyer Anderson fired eight torpedoes as well. Only six of them hit, and Hornet again failed to be sunk. The American ships resorted to using gunfire. After 300 rounds, they failed once again. Hornet finally sank at 0130 on 27 Oct after the arrival of Kondo's fleet at the face of four Japanese 24-inch torpedoes.

After achieving this tactical victory during the fourth major carrier confrontation of the Pacific War, Kondo withdrew his forces to Truk.

Attacks on New Georgia
9 Dec 1942-24 Jan 1943

The New Georgia group of islands was about one hundred miles north of Guadalcanal. The five large islands were originally bypassed by the Japanese in favor of skipping to Guadalcanal, but as the American Marines garrisoned the captured Henderson Field, the strategy was revised as more land-based planes were needed to strike Guadalcanal. On 24 Nov 1942 a large Japanese convoy sailed for a small clearing on the western side of New Georgia island, currently used by a small coconut plantation. Although the convoy attracted American attention as early as 28 Nov, American intelligence saw nothing there based on aerial photographs besides a few scattered small buildings. Finally, on 3 Dec, a sharp-eyed American intelligence expert saw something: the Japanese were building an airfield underneath the neat rows of coconut trees. Whenever a tree needed to be uprooted, overhead wires were laid and dressed with leaves so that the appearance of a tree was maintained in the same location. On 6 Dec, American aircraft from Henderson Field paid a low-level visit to the location and confirmed the existence of the airfield after strafing at the Japanese engineers and troops there.

On 9 Dec, the first major operation against the newly constructed Munda Field was mounted. 18 B-17 bombers began a series of raids by various types of aircraft on Munda. On 13 Dec PBY Catalina aircraft began their occasional night time bombings.

On 4 Jan 1943, while US Army infantry were advancing on Guadalcanal on a planned offensive, Halsey sent a fleet to bombard Munda Field to divert any aerial reinforcement that might be sent to disrupt the Army offensive. The bombardment force consisted of three light cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Walden Ainsworth; the support group behind them had three light cruisers, one heavy cruiser, and three destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Mahlon Tisdale. Shortly after 0100 in the early morning of 5 Jan, the bombardment commenced. For the next 50 minutes they had deposited nearly 3,000 rounds of 6-in shells and 1,400 rounds of 5-in shells on the Japanese airfield. The next morning, American reconnaissance aircraft visited Munda Field and reported a heavily damaged airfield and no sign of enemy anti-aircraft fire. A retaliatory strike by air came as the ships were steaming home, but it only damaged one of the turrets atop the New Zealand destroyer Achilles that sailed with the support group.

Munda Field was not the only airfield the Japanese constructed in the New Georgia island group. Another field, Vila, was built on the southern tip of Kolombangara. In the evening of 23 Jan, Ainsworth made another trip up the slot to New Georgia. At 0200 on 24 Jan, his bombardment group consisted of two light cruisers and four destroyers began firing. In the following hour the two light cruisers nearly sent 2,000 rounds of 6-in shells at the direction of the airfield, and the destroyers added 1,500 rounds of 5-in. A few return fires came from coastal batteries, but they were generally ineffective. The Japanese then tried to defend from the air, but a convenient squall together with radar-directed anti-aircraft gunnery saved the American ships.

After day break on 24 Jan, 24 SBDs, 17 TBFs, and 18 F4Fs took off from Henderson Field to follow up on the attack. The American aircraft dropped 23 tons of bombs on Vila by 0800.

Although the "Ainsworth Express" runs, augmented with aerial bombardments, were effective in damaging the Japanese airfields, overall the Japanese engineers were as capable in repairing damaged airfields as the American Marine engineers were with Henderson. The attacks achieved short term objectives by disrupting Japanese capabilities to launch land-based aircraft, but in the long run Halsey knew that the only way he could halt the operations from these new fields was to take them from the Japanese. That was something he was not ready to do, yet.

Battle of Rennell Island
29-30 Jan 1943

Some time in the afternoon of 29 Jan 1943, American radar detected a group of unknown aircraft. Since the radar identification system was not very reliable, the American radar operators of Rear Admiral Robert Giffen's Task Force 18 did not know what to relay to the admiral. The aircraft were Japanese, and they were in an exact opposite situation, with friendly submarines stationed near Giffen's force to give them up-to-the-minute status updates. The 31 Japanese torpedo bombers struck Giffen's two escort carriers, three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers 50 miles north of Rennell Island, the southern-most island of the Solomon Islands. The torpedo bombers circled the southern rim of the task force and attacked from the east in two groups. The first wave of attacks saw at least one torpedo bomber splash into the waves, and the American ships turned hard to avoid the torpedoes. The second wave came some time later after Giffen's sailors had relaxed their guards. To their surprise, white floating flares were dropped from Japanese aircraft to light the path of the ships' movement, so that the Japanese torpedo bombers knew exactly where to strike in the dim lighting conditions of the early night. At 1931, the bombers launched their torpedoes. One hit cruiser Louisville but it failed to detonate and the rest missed; again at least one bomber was downed by the newly equipped Mark-32 anti-aircraft shells. At 1938, another run was made, and this time the Japanese pilots drew blood. Destroyer Walker was hit astern, and cruiser Chicago at port bow. As Chicago slowed, another hit her starboard side at 1945 and crippled her. At 2000, Giffen ordered a change in course. Between the course change and the darkening conditions, the Japanese pilots lost the task force and headed for home by 2015. They had lost 12 of their fellow pilots on this raid.

At 2030, Louisville took station near Chicago, and their crews completed a stunning manual effort to hook up the heavy steel hawser to Chicago's towing tackle. Louisville towed Chicago until day break next day and transferred the tow to tugboat Navajo. As Navajo towed Chicago at four knots and escorted by six destroyers, 12 torpedo bombers of the same "Betty" type struck at 1540 on 30 Jan 1943. The few that got through the combat air patrol launched their torpedoes and fatally wounded Chicago. Captain Ralph Davis of Chicago evacuated his ship in about 20 minutes, and a few moments after the last of the 1,049 survivors left the ship, she sank stern first.

The returning Japanese pilots thought they had gotten a battleship, and reported to their superiors as so. The propaganda machine at Tokyo quickly announced this battle as a great victory. Both William Halsey (in the post-battle report) and Samuel Eliot Morison (in his 1949 book) blamed Giffen's inexperience in the theater for the loss of Chicago; Giffen had just been transferred to the South Pacific only days before this battle from Casablanca.

Landing on the Russell Islands
21 Feb 1943

The Russell Islands immediately northwest to Guadalcanal were captured by the Allied forces without significant Japanese opposition.

Battle of the Bismarck Sea
3-4 Mar 1943

While the Guadalcanal campaign was raging, an equally bitter series of battles was occurring on the island of New Guinea. Under the direction of Japanese war minister Hajime Sugiyama, Japanese troops were sent to seize an airfield near Wau, thirty-two miles from Salamaua. MacArthur's forces were ready for them, routing the Japanese invaders with an Australian brigade. Then IGHQ ordered a convoy from Rabaul to land much-needed reinforcements in the Buna-Gona area. These reinforcements were to It was composed of eight transports escorted by eight destroyers, and screened by an inadequate light combat air patrol. The convoy set sail riding on the front of heavy weather (to mask their trail), and MacArthur expected that, too. He had his air chief Kenney to keep on the lookout, and Kenney's scouts made contact with the Japanese ships on 1 Mar.

The American air force had been experimenting with a new aerial tactic called skip-bombing, wherein the attacking airplane drops a bomb with a long-delay fuze close to the surface and lets it skip into the side of the target ship. This was the first occasion in which the Americans would use this new tactic. As soon as the Japanese came under the radius of American airpower, the convoy was attacked relentlessly by B-17s. The first day's attack sank two transports and damaged a third. Two destroyers were tasked with rescuing the survivors and making a high speed run to New Guinea to deposit them. This they did, and returned to the plodding convoy before dawn the next day.

March 4 proved to be a disaster for the Japanese. Coming within range of American and Australian medium bombers, the convoy was savaged by skip-bombing and strafing. By noon, all six remaining transports and four of the destroyers were sinking or sunk. The remaining four destroyers recovered what few survivors they could and fled north to Rabaul. A handful of Japanese troops did make it ashore, but they had to swim. After this, the Japanese would never again attempt to run slow transports into the face of American airpower.

When Kenney awoke MacArthur to inform him the news of the victory at Bismarck Sea, Kenney commented that "I had never seen him so jubilant". MacArthur, at a press conference that soon followed the Bismarck Sea action, declared that the control of the sea "no longer depends solely or even primarily upon naval power, but upon air power operating from land bases held by ground troops". This offended members of the US Navy, but even the admirals could not deny that airpower was a decisive factor in the Pacific War.

Landings on New Georgia
30 Jun 1943 - 5 Aug 1943

New Georgia lay immediately to the northwest of the Russell Islands, housing Japanese airfields at Munda and Vila. To soften up the defenses there before the landing, flights from Henderson bombed New Georgia, resulting in disabling the two before-mentioned airfields (Japanese would alternatively use Rabaul and Bougainville as launch points of air missions after these two airfields were destroyed). When Japanese submarine RO103 spotted Admiral Turner's amphibious force approaching from the south on 30 Jun, the Japanese commanders were taken by surprise, and were not able to react efficiently to the subsequent landing, though two freighters were sunk by submarines off New Georgia.

New Georgia was invaded from five landing points. When the landings took place, a Japanese air raid was launched in attempt to disrupt the landings. A torpedo damaged (later she was abandoned, then sunk in error by American PT boats) Turner's flagship, transport McCawley, but the air raid was more or less ineffective in the intended disruption. The Allied landers faced much difficulties from reefs, mud, and intense bombardments, in addtion to strong resistance from Major General Noboru Sasaki's 5,000 troops. This obscure island took the American troops a significant amount of time to capture: the major airfield, Munda, fell to the Americans on 5 Aug 1943.

Battle of Kula Gulf
5-6 Jul 1943

On the night of 5 Jul, an American cruiser and destroyer task force was notified of the approach of a Japanese destroyer reinforcement group outbound from Buin. The Americans reversed course and moved to meet them off of Kolombangara. First contact was made at 0106 by Japanese radar (note that the use of radar is rare for the Japanese Navy) aboard Niizuki. The Americans enjoyed an advantage in terms of gunfire, and the Japanese had several ships loaded with combat troops, but as usual the Japanese advantage in torpedoes and tactices made up the difference. Being the keen night warriers as they were, the Japanese launched their newest 24-inch torpedoes against the flashing American guns.

The Americans maintained a line-ahead formation and began firing at 0157. They quickly demolished Niizuki, which drew fire from every American cruiser. Japanese torpedoes were already in the water, however, and at 0203 they hit Helena, which lost her bow back to the No. 2 turret, and then took another two hits which sank her. Meanwhile, the Japanese had several vessels damaged and one destroyer sunk (killing Admiral Akiyama) by gunfire, and Nagatsuki had run aground (she was destroyed by bombing runs on the next day). Both forces began a general retirement.

165 of Helena's survivors were missed by general rescue efforts. They hung on to various floating devices, and eventually made their ways to the island of Vella Lavella. They would be aided by local Australian Coastwatchers and friendly locals. They were rescued by destroyers on 16 Jul.

As the battle wore on, both sides still had destroyers in the area attempting to rescue survivors; one Japanese and two American. Around 0500 Amagiri and Nicholas exchanged torpedoes and then gunfire. Amagiri was hit and retired, leaving Niizuki's survivors to their fate. The Americans, by contrast succeeded in rescuing many of Helena's survivors. The final casualty was Nagatsuki; abandoned by her crew in the morning after they failed to get her afloat, she was bombed into a sinking state by US planes.

The losses were about even for both sides. Given the disadvantages the Japanese had labored under, the Americans really ought to have done better. This battle is intriguing, too, for the fact that it was the Japanese who used their search radar effectively. However, American radar gunfire control (which the Japanese still did not have) had allowed them to inflict rapid damage to the opposing force.

During the actions at Kula Gulf, the Japanese were successful in landing over 2,000 troops.

Battle of Kolombangara
12-13 Jul 1943

A Tokyo Express led by Rear Admiral Shunji Izaki and his light cruiser Jintsu and four destroyer-transports was met by Ainsworth's Task Group 18. New Zealand light cruiser Leander and other light cruisers and destroyers were targetted by Japanese torpedoes before they opened gunfire against the Japanese. The Japanese were radar-less, but they were eqiupped with radar direction-finding equipment which aided them greatly, including the early clues of American ship locations that allowed them to fire their torpedoes early.

The veteran Jintsu was destroyed by 2,600 rounds of cruiser shells, killing Admiral Izaki himself. The Americans lost a destroyer, Gwin, and sustained heavy damage on light cruisers Honolulu and St. Louis. The Japanese landed 1,200 troops on Kolombangara and withdrew to Buin in Bougainville. This confrontation was another example of Japanese skillfulness with torpedoes; not only that the Japanese torpedoes could travel much further (21 miles!) than their inferior American counterparts, the Japanese could also reload their torpedo tubes twice as quickly than the American sailors.

Battle of Vella Gulf
6-7 Aug 1943

Yet another Japanese destroyer reinforcement group, this time headed for Kolombangara, was intercepted by an American destroyer force near Vella Lavella, under the command of American Commander Frederick Moosbrugger. The Americans used the black backdrop of Kolombangara to hide their ships. They also avoided using their guns until their torpedoes were in the water. By the time Shigure, which was at the tail end of the Japanese column (with Tameichi Hara aboard) spotted the Americans at 2344, the American fish were about a minute away from their targets. As Shigure began launching an eight-fish salvo, the three lead Japanese destroyers were hit within moments of each other. Shigure, too, was hit by a dud torpedo as she turned away. The fish punched a hole in her rudder.

The Americans then closed in to finish the job with gunfire. Practically no resistance came from the crippled Japanese DDs. Shigure had no choice but to run for her life. In all, the Japanese had lost three ships and over 1,500 men (900 of which were land troops). The Americans suffered not a single casualty, much attributed to the well-drilled American sailors. The Japanese survivors in the water refused rescue from the American destroyers.

This battle is important because for the first time American destroyers had demonstrated that, given the opportunity, they could meet and best their opposite numbers. By being relieved of their normal duties of screening cruisers, and the linear tactics that role had thus far imposed, the American DDs were able to employ innovative torpedo tactics which had worked beautifully. The Japanese Navy had been served notice that its reign of nighttime torpedo supremacy was at an end.

Battle off Horaniu
18 Aug 1943

By mid-July, the situation on Kolombangara was such that the Japanese were making every effort to remove heir troops. American troops were by now overpowering the Japanese, totalling 6,300 men on the island. A Japanese barge convoy, escorted by destroyers, was sent out on 17 Aug to attempt the evacuation mission. An American destroyer force had come north that night to intercept and destroy the barges.

Both forces spotted each other at 0029 on 18 Aug. The Japanese launched torpedoes at very long range, but the Americans had formed up line abreast and thus combed their wakes. After another series of manuevers, however, the two destroyer forces found themselves line abreast and within long gunfire range. Both groups hammered away at each other, but were generally ineffective. At around 0100 the Isokaze's radar (erroneously) detected another American force closing from the south, at which point the Japanese retired. In the interim, though, most of the Japanese barges had scattered, leaving only two for the Americans to find and sink.

Neither side had been particularly impressive this night. The only redeeming feature for the Americans was the fact that with radar controlled gunfire they had at least scored more near-misses and straddles than their enemy. The other important thing to note is that, once again, the Americans had demonstrated that their destroyers (at least) were beginning to learn how to take the sting out of Japanese torpedo tactics.

On 14 Sep, the Japanese garrison on Kolombangara would fall to American control.

Battle of Vella Lavella
6 Oct 1943

In October, the Japanese ran another destroyer barge force towards Vella Lavella to try and rescue the 600-some soldiers stranded there, in what Dan van der Vat said was "a militarily correct decision... to evacuate it". An American destroyer group was dispatched to block this movement. Interestingly, a relatively large task force was sent to rescue less than one battalion, but for once the Japanese would enjoy a numerical advantage as they outnumbered the American destroyers nine to six (although three of them were converted to troop carriers). This task force was led by Rear Admiral Masuji Ijuin and it came from Rabaul. The American counterpart was led by Captain Frank Walker. Walker decided not to join his two groups of three destroyers before approaching the likely scene of battle. Thus he would bring his three 'tin cans' up against a much superior force.

The Japanese actually spotted the Americans visually a minute before American radar returned the favor, but the Japanese were unsure of their sighting for another several minutes. As luck would have it, their course and speed were such that they stood a good chance of crossing the American 'T'. However, the Japanese commander then engaged his squadron in a complex series of evolutions which wasted the intial advantage. At 2256, both columns opened up on each other simultaneously.

The American destroyer Chevalier was crippled almost immediately to a torpedo, and the next destroyer in line O'Bannon then proceeded to ram her sister. However, American gunfire was simultaneously tearing Yugumo apart. After a brief exchange of further gunnery between Selfridge, Shigure and Samidare, the Japanese retreated the way the came, apparently fearing larger American forces were approaching the area (by the time Captain Harold Larson's three destroyers came by, the Japanese were already gone). The Japanese barges, however, accomplished their mission and rescued all the remaining Japanese troops on the island. All in all, not an impressive showing for the Americans, who should have waited to join forces before attacking the Japanese.

As usual, both side exaggerated claims of enemy ships sunk, but in conclusion the Japanese scored a small tactical victory here. However, at the end of this night action, Japanese presence would be completely withdrawn from the central Solomons region.

Attack on Bougainville
17 Oct 1943

The next target with the Island Hopping campaign was the island of Bougainville, a former German colony that was mandated to Australia in 1919 after WW1. Nearly the entire 130-mile by 30-mile area was dense jungle, with a exception of a small coastal plain at the southern end. The Japanese Bougainville garrison totalled 60,000 men, deployed on Bougainville, Shortlands, Buka, and Treasury islands. There were a total of five military airfields under Japanese control. To attack Bougainville, Admiral Halsey's Third Fleet and Admiral Fitch's land-based aircraft went into MacArthur's jurisdiction. The amphibious force consisted of Major General Roy Geiger's US Marines.

To soften the landings, American aircraft bombed the five Japanese airfields late in October. Although these bombings confused the Japanese in that they could not determine where the Americans would strike next, the bombings were a bit overrated as over 200 aircraft were still operational for the defenders at the time of the landings. Admiral Koga decided to deploy 173 aircraft, taken away from the precious carriers, to the area in determination to destroy the next wave of American attackers by air power. This defense plan was Operation RO.

Treasury Islands was attacked by New Zealand troops on 17 Oct, with the goal of gaining a logistical base for further Bougainville actions. On the main island of Mono, well dug-in machine gun nests were giving Allied troops a difficult time. Captain Robert Briscoe of the light cruiser Denver recalled how the landing troops took care of this obstacle in a brutal and unorthodox manner:

The Treasury Islands were under Allied control by 6 Nov.

On 1 Nov 1943, the Americans landed a large amphibious force on Bougainville under the command of Major General Turnage of the US Marines. The landing force was counterattacked by two waves of air attacks, but to no significant impact. The Japanese forces at the particular landing site totaled less than 300, therefore posing only a small threat despite the carefully laid machine gun cross fire and artillery. Once the forces headed inland, however, the difficulty began. The Marines soon found out that the naval bombardment "had accomplished nothing", as noted in Marine Corps' official history. The men faced Japanese defenders well entrenched and well hidden in the dense tropical jungles.

With the attack on Bougainville taking place, he Americans expected a vigorous response from the Japanese from the sea, and indeed response was given. Admiral Sentaro Omori sortied from Rabaul at once with a powerful surface force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers. The American Task Force 39 was under the command of Rear Admiral Stanton Merrill. Having sent most of their assault transports out of the danger zone before nightfall, Merrill awaited the Japanese with four light cruisers and eight destroyers. The advantage in both gunfire and torpedoes clearly lay with the Japanese.

Fortunately for the Americans, the Japanese force was a 'pick-up' team which hadn't practiced together, and Omori tried playing a game that was a little over his head. Confused by conflicting reports he was receiving from his scout planes as to the composition of the American force to his south, he executed a series of 180-degree turns (in pitch blackness) which were designed to give his aircraft more time to bring him information. Instead, all they did was throw his squadron into disarray, leaving his screening force far out of position, just as the Americans arrived on the scene. The Americans, coming upon the Japanese screen, launched torpedoes first, and then opened with the cruisers' 6-inch guns. The Japanese screening force, upon spotting American destroyers, tried desperately to evade the torps they knew to be in the water, and ended up either colliding with each other or suffering near-misses. Sendai nearly hit Shigure, and Samidare sideswiped Shiratsuyu, staving in her hull and putting her out of the fight. Sendai was then buried in 6-inch gunfire.

Omori tried bringing his main body into the battle. This only succeeded in causing further collisions, as Myoko tore Hatsukaze's bow off, and Haguro nearly hit two other destroyers. A brief, inconclusive fight followed between the two Japanese heavies and the four American lights. Although the Japanese launched a large salvo of torpedoes, they were ineffective. The Americans achieved several gunfire straddles, but failed to hit their targets. At 0229 Omori ordered a general withdrawal. The Americans found the hapless Hatsukaze (Myoko was still wearing her bow when she returned to Rabaul) and sank her with gunfire.

The Japanese had clearly lost this fight, failing to bring their heavy units to bear conclusively, and wiping out most of their own screening destroyers through their own ill-considered maneuvers. The invasion of Bougainville wouldn't be stopped this night. For his defeat, Omori was relieved of his command upon returning to Rabaul.

During the first week of Nov 1943, while the Americans raided Rabaul (see below), Americans reinforced their beachhead on Bougainville, while the Japanese sneaked two convoys by the Americans ships to land more troops on the northern tip of the island. The aircraft Koga ordered to reinforce the area were sent on air raids to disrupt American operations, but no little effect, while wearing away irreplaceable Japanese pilots. However, the usual practice of exaggerating damange reports led to Koga's declaration of Operation RO a success, and received a personal word of thanks from Emperor Showa (Hirohito). American progress on Bougainville slowed during the rest of Nov 1943.

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay
1-2 Nov 1943

On 1 Nov, the US 3rd Marine Division invaded the beaches of Empress Augusta Bay, backed by four light cruisers and eight destroyers. As a response, a powerful naval force of two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroyers sailed from Rabaul steamed with air cover under the command of Admiral Sentaro Omori. The Americans made radar contact at 0230 in the morning of 2 Nov and immediately launched a destroyer torpedo attack. The Japanese fleet dodged the torpedo run, but in turn the formation was scattered. At 0250, American cruisers opened fire, quickly disabling cruiser Sendai. A series of Japanese mis-maneuvers led to two collisions; it was not until 0313 that the Japanese fleet pulled together and began firing on the American ships. The battle did not last long after that point as the American ships turned and withdrew from the battle. While the battle was rather inconclusive, the Americans achieved their goal in preventing Japanese interference with the operation.

This engagement was also known as Battle of Gazelle Bay, Operation Cherry Blossom, and the Sea Battle of Bougainville Bay Shore.

Carrier Raid on Rabaul
5-11 Nov 1943

Rabaul on the island of New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago was the stronghold of Japanese defense near the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. Five separate airfields ringed the base there, stocked with several hundred army and navy aircraft maintained by 20,000 of the Empire's best aircraft technicians. The anchorage at Simpson's Harbor, "the Pearl Harbor of the South Pacific," was usually swarmed with a variety of Japanese warships. As a result, it had never been seriously threatened by the Americans. However, with the invasion of Bougainville, Rabaul was now directly jeopardized for the first time, and Rabaul was beginning to be reinforced further. In response, starting on 12 Oct 1943, General George Kenney's US 5th Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Royal New Zealand Air Force attacked Rabaul with land-based aircraft, with the biggest strike on 2 Nov. The threat of Allied attacks now materializing, the Japanese Navy reacted to reinforce Rabaul and prepare a counterstrike against the Bougainville invasion by moving a variety of additional cruisers to Rabaul.

The further reinforcement was potentially bad news for the Americans, for that American surface units would be even more exposed to the threat posed by the major Japanese base as they operated to support the Bougainville invasion. This threat was demonstrated by the Japanese attempt to disrupt American operations at Empress Augusta Bay during the night of 1-2 Nov. Furthermore, most of the American battleships and cruisers were elsewhere preparing for the invasion of Tarawa. In order to pre-empt a move by the Japanese, Rear Admiral Frederick Sherman put together a bold operational plan to attack the Japanese force at its base. Racing in under a weather front with two carriers, Saratoga and Princeton, Sherman relied on land-based airpower from New Guinea to protect his ships, while launching every one of his own planes to attack Rabaul. He was rewarded by near total surprise and clear weather over the target. Simpson's Harbor was crowded with ships, and most of them were refueling and not prepared to get underway. As they frantically cast off and scrambled for the harbor entrance, American aircraft had a field day. While no Japanese ships were sunk, six cruisers were damaged and would have to be sent back to Japan for months of repair work. Fewer than a dozen attacking aircraft were shot down. Upon recovering their aircraft, Sherman's raiders then raced away southward towards friendly air cover. The Japanese were unable to locate them before they escaped. Any Japanese hopes of contesting the Bougainville landings had vanished.

On 11 Nov, a second major carrier raid was launched by Saratoga, Princeton, Bunker Hill, Essex, and Independence.

No one realized it at the time, but Rabaul was essentially finished as a prime naval base for the Japanese. Land-based airpower would now keep it under constant air attack, and its own air groups would be steadily depleted. As time passed, Rabaul would become a backwater, its garrison of nearly 100,000 men left to 'wither on the vine,' its large group of skilled aircraft mechanics left with less and less to do. Since some of Rabaul's aircraft were recently redeployed here from carriers, this attack also took away strength from the Japanese fleet's air arm.

Battle of Cape St. George
26 Nov 1943

With the Americans now consolidating their hold over Bougainville, the Japanese began beefing up troops and supplies on the island of Buka. On November 25, they put together yet another 'Tokyo Express' of five destroyers, three of them laden with troops, and sent them out of Rabaul. This force was commanded by Captain Kiyoto Kagawa. Waiting for them were six American destroyers. The Japanese succeeded in dropping off their loads at Buka, but trouble began on the way back home.

American Navy Captain Arleigh Burke's radar spotted the Japanese first, allowing the Americans to close and launch torpedoes without being initially detected. Both of the Japanese screening destroyers were hit, sinking the Onami and crippling the Makinami. The Americans then closed in on the destroyer-transports, who scattered and ran for it. Yugiri didn't make it, being pounded by several opponents. The crippled Makinami was also sunk. The American forces tried a stern chase of the other two fleeing Japanese destroyers, but were unable to catch them.

No realized it at the time, but this was the last 'Tokyo Express', and the last surface fight in the Solomons. Freed from screening duties, US destroyers had again held their own against their vaunted Japanese adversaries. There would be no more major naval battles until the invasion of Saipan.

Landings on New Britain
15-25 Dec 1943

In Dec 1943 MacArthur landed 2,000 of his men at Arawe, on the southwest coast of New Britain. Then days later, on Christmas Day, the entire First Marine Divisoin landed at Cape Gloucester. In retrospect, this operation was a wasted effort as the Americans already controlled the sea nearby. Perhaps MacArthur was under the obsolete impression that you must control land on both sides of a body of water in order to control it? In general, the Japanese troops on New Britain resisted but did not pose great difficulties for MacArthur's troops.

Photographs

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Visitor Submitted Comments

1. Anders Gastgifvars says:
   25 Apr 2006 02:11:55 PM
   
   Good article but I miss a map (or link) and a few details about the locations:
   -which of the battles are actually related to Guadancanal?
   -Some more background info to put this campaign into perspective, please!
   -No reference to Tokyo Express nor Savo island!
   -Distances ro Espiritu Santo and Rabaul (main bases?)
   -Very few Japanese viewpoints
   -Summary of vessels lostdamaged
   Othervise VERY good!
2. ROBERT KELLEY says:
   2 Aug 2006 06:14:06 PM
   
   MY FATHER WAS IN WW2 I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO FIND A PICTURE OF PONTOTOC VICTORY SHIP, THEONE HE CAME BACK ON CAN YOU HELP ME
3. Jenice Northcutt says:
   19 Nov 2007 12:42:20 PM
   
   I am looking for a photo for a friend (marine)who was in the war. He said he was bare chested wearing beads and holding up a blanket. Attack on bougainville 1943.
   Please help.
4. Tom Stein says:
   1 Jan 2008 07:05:30 PM
   
   I am looking for a photo or information regarding my father, John William Stein, who was in the Marines who fought at Bougainville in WWII. Is he partially pictured in the back of the photo captioned U.S. Marine Raiders gather in front of a Japanese dugout on Cape Totkina, Bougainville? He later died in a car accident at Quantico, Va. when I was two years so I never knew much about him. Anyone know or know of him? Please help. Thank you.
5. Anonymous says:
   16 Jan 2008 07:28:54 PM
   
   My uncle Harold A. Mulligan was on the
   USS PRESTON (DD-379) when it was sunk
   11-14-1942. The USS Preston took 116 men
   down with her. Is there a way to find
   the names of the ship crew.
   Thank you,
   
   Robert McBride
6. Anonymous says:
   9 Feb 2008 08:54:48 PM
   
   Am looking for information on Corporal Lin Cunningham who was a coastwatcher in Vella Lavella 1943-44.Any details appreciated. Many thanks, Ellen Hyland
7. Dr. Ian Taupongi Puia says:
   17 May 2009 08:38:43 AM
   
   On 12th November 1942, a look out post was established on Rennell Island, Solomon Islands and commanded by 1st Lt. Emmett N. Carter plus 10 marines. They were a detachment from th 2nd Marines based on Espirtu Santos.
   I wish to know the full names of the 10 marines who stationed on Rennell untill 3rd January 1943 when they left.
   See the book Hells Islands by Stanley Coleman
8. chris says:
   17 Oct 2009 02:45:43 PM
   
   i need a list of marines that fought with ira hayes. i work in a retirement home and wondered if any of my residents were there let me know
9. Rick says:
   8 Nov 2009 09:16:44 PM
   
   My father David D. Roberge, was a Petty officer on the Black Gang, of the Fletcher Calss Destroyer Chevalier DD-451 Sunk off of Vella LaVella, in the battle of Vella LaVella, on 6 Oct,1943 Cruising with the Nickolas, the O'Bannon, and the Selfridge
10. Michael Wardlaw says:
    11 Nov 2009 08:14:09 AM
    
    My Grandpa was on the Lucky Lou during WW2. His name was RMC Robert Phellps. His nickname was "Pappy", this was due to his age. Please write if you knew or heard any stories about him. Thankyou.

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